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FIGHTING BACK:  HOW STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES CAN HOLD SCHOOLS LIABLE 
FOR PEER-INFLICTED INJURIES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Renee Soper was a special needs student at OxBow Elementary 
School in Michigan.1  She attended both special education and 
mainstream classes outside of the special education program.2  School 
officials allowed Renee to walk unattended from her special education 
classes to the mainstream classes.3  In 1993, Brandon, a middle school 
boy two years older than Renee, led Renee off school property and 
kissed her.4  Renee reported what happened to her mother, Lina Soper.5  
Lina immediately called Renee’s teacher, Ms. Rombach, and requested 
that someone watch both Renee and Brandon to prevent future 
problems.6  A year later, before Renee transitioned to Muir Middle 
School, Lina met with Renee’s new “educable mentally impaired” 
(“EMI”) teacher, Ms. Harmala, and reiterated her concerns about 
Brandon.7  Ms. Harmala assured Lina that “we’ll keep an eye on the 
children.  They’re well supervised.”8  The school placed Renee in Ms. 
Harmala’s EMI classroom with ten other students, including Brandon.9  
                                                 
1 Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1999).  Renee was a “mentally 
retarded” child who had been labeled “‘educable mentally impaired’ (‘EMI’)” at her 
elementary school.  Id.  The Michigan Administrative Code defines EMI as a person 
identified with a developmental rate two to three deviations below the mean intellectual 
assessment, standardized test scores within the lowest sixth percentile in reading and 
math, lack of cognitive development, and an unsatisfactory academic performance not 
based on the student’s social, economic, and cultural factors.  Id. at n.1. 
2 Id. at 848. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  “Brandon” is a fictitious name created by the author. 
5 Id.  Renee also told her mother, Lina, that after Brandon kissed her, he told her that he 
was excited for her to start middle school.  Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 848–49.  Before Renee started at Muir Middle School, Lina and Renee’s teachers 
attended an Individualized Education Program Committee (“IEPC”) meeting, during 
which the school ultimately concluded that Renee should remain in the EMI program.  Id. 
at 848.  Furthermore, the school determined that Ms. Harmala would implement Renee’s 
IEP.  Id.  Renee was twelve years old but cognitively functioned at the level of a seven-year-
old.  Id.  Her IEPC stated that her “social responsibility and personal independence [are] 
still quite deficient for her age.”  Id. at 848 n.2. 
8 Id. at 849.  Lina claimed that she had disclosed both Renee’s history of sexual abuse 
and prior incident with Brandon to Ms. Harmala.  Id. at 848–49.  Ms. Harmala, however, 
denied that she knew about the prior incident between Renee and Brandon and also denied 
making a statement promising constant supervision while at school.  Id. at 849. 
9 Id.  The EMI classroom had no aide, even though Ms. Harmala had requested one 
because of the increasing number of students in her multi-station classroom.  Id. 
Smith: Fighting Back: How Students with Disabilities Can Hold Schools Li
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
742 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
At the beginning of the school year, Lina, with knowledge of Brandon’s 
abusive family background, requested that Renee never be left alone 
with him.10 
On October 6, 1994, Renee told her mother that two boys in her EMI 
class had sexually assaulted her in the Muir Middle School EMI 
classroom while Ms. Harmala was in the hallway.11  Renee also reported 
that Brandon, whom Ms. Harmala had allowed to escort Renee to her 
locker, raped her in the classroom after Ms. Harmala left the room for 
lunch.12  The boys involved threatened to beat up Renee if she told 
anyone about the assault.13  Lina confronted Ms. Harmala and Muir 
Middle School’s principal and reported the events to law enforcement.14  
After Lina reported the rape, the school district took many remedial 
steps, including installing windows to the EMI classroom, placing an 
aide in the room with Ms. Harmala, and having an aide on the school 
bus with EMI students.15  Criminal charges were brought against 
Brandon, but the other two boys were never prosecuted.16 
The Sopers filed a complaint in Oakland County Circuit Court 
against Ms. Harmala, the Muir Middle School principal, the 
superintendent, the school district, and the school board for negligence, 
gross negligence, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a violation of Title 
IX.17  The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, rejecting Renee’s § 1983 and Title IX claims.18  
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  Renee also reported that the two boys had fondled her on the school bus.  Id. 
12 Id.  Renee explained that Ms. Harmala allowed Brandon to assist her to open her 
locker.  Id.  While Ms. Harmala was locking up the classroom for lunch, Brandon then 
forced Renee to hide in the back of the room.  Id.  Once Ms. Harmala had left the room, 
Brandon raped her.  Id.  Brandon claimed the sexual penetration was consensual and the 
other boys denied ever fondling Renee on the bus or in the EMI classroom.  Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  Ms. Harmala contacted both Child Protective Services and Renee’s mainstream 
teachers to inform them of Renee’s allegations and to develop a supervision plan, which 
included an escort.  Id. 
15 Id. at 850.  The school also advised Renee, Brandon, and the other two EMI boys 
allegedly involved “to attend student counseling sessions concerning how to function 
socially with the opposite sex.”  Id. 
16 Id.  Renee returned to school in 1995.  Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 850, 853, 855.  The Sixth Circuit rejected the § 1983 claim, finding that the 
plaintiff did not prove that the defendants violated a constitutionally protected right and 
thus were entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 853.  The court also denied Title IX liability 
because of the “prompt and thorough response by school officials to the Sopers’ 
complaint.”  Id. at 855. 
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Consequently, Renee was left without a remedy for the assaults against 
her.19 
Cases such as Renee’s are all too common.20  Children with 
disabilities suffer from foreseeable injuries inflicted by their peers while 
they are in school and under the supervision of school officials, yet these 
schools and school officials are able to escape liability.21  The current 
legal remedies have yet to catch up with reality, and victims such as 
Renee are left without any hope of a remedy.22  A change in legal theory 
is necessary in order to encourage schools to prevent these injuries and, 
if they fail to do so, to compensate those students who fall victim to peer-
inflicted injury as a result of inadequate school supervision.23 
To begin, Part II.A of this Note explains how students with 
disabilities are easy targets for victimization by their peers.24  Part II.B 
reviews several statutes and causes of action typically utilized by victims 
like Renee to attempt to hold a school liable for their injuries.25  Next, 
Part III analyzes and critiques the courts’ treatment of victims’ claims 
under these statutes and causes of action.26  Finally, Part IV proposes a 
solution that utilizes and expands upon the tort theory of negligent 
supervision.27  Part IV.A proposes that courts throughout the country 
recognize that harm to special education students is foreseeable, as 
supported by both the California Court of Appeal’s method of analyzing 
the issue, demonstrated by M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School and 
Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, and the approach adopted 
by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.28  In addition, Part IV.B proposes 
that courts also recognize a presumption that schools have a heightened 
duty to supervise students with disabilities and that it is reasonably 
                                                 
19 See id. at 853, 855 (holding that the school was not liable). 
20 See infra Part II.B (reviewing existing case law and other examples of children with 
disabilities subjected to peer-inflicted abuse). 
21 See infra Part III (noting the general ineffectiveness of the current legal theories). 
22 See infra Part III (reiterating that schools and school officials tend to avoid liability 
under the current legal theories). 
23 See infra Part IV (presenting a model statute and a common law presumption of duty 
and foreseeability as the legal theories that can effectively address this problem). 
24 See infra Part II.A (demonstrating that children with disabilities are disproportionately 
subject to abuse by their peers while in school). 
25 See infra Part II.B (exploring various cases in which schools and school officials have 
failed to intervene and prevent abuse inflicted by peers upon students with disabilities). 
26 See infra Part III (analyzing the current legal theories utilized by victims). 
27 See infra Part IV (proposing that courts should view the infliction of injury on special 
education students by their peers as foreseeable). 
28 See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that courts adopt a method of reasoning similar to the 
California Court of Appeals and find that injuries inflicted upon children with disabilities 
are foreseeable). 
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foreseeable for a student with a disability, absent such supervision, to be 
injured by a peer.29 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Generally, students with disabilities are often the targets of injuries 
and victimization at the hands of their peers.30  As a result, victims often 
turn to various legal remedies to bring claims against the school officials 
who allowed such abuse to occur.31  This section explains several statutes 
and sources that can be utilized to remedy the wrong, along with 
accompanying case law identifying the success and failures of such 
causes of action.32  First, Part II.A discusses how students with 
disabilities tend to be easy targets for peer-inflicted injuries.33  Part II.B.1 
explores theories of negligent supervision under state tort law.34  Next, 
Part II.B.2 discusses causes of action under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.35  Finally, Part II.B.3 examines actions under Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments Act of 1972 and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).36 
                                                 
29 See infra Part IV.B (recommending that courts recognize a presumption of 
foreseeability in regards to injuries inflicted upon children with disabilities). 
30 See infra Part II.A (discussing how children with disabilities are more prone to 
victimization by peers due to perceived differences).  For the purposes of this Note, a 
“child with a disability” is defined pursuant to the United States Code, which states that a 
“child with a disability” is a child 
 (i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including 
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments 
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, 
or specific learning disabilities; and 
 (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education . . . services. 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
31 See infra Part II.B (noting some traditional causes of action that are available to 
victims). 
32 See infra Part II.B (discussing several cases in which victims of peer-inflicted injury 
attempt to bring school districts and officials to justice by utilizing some common causes of 
action). 
33 See infra Part II.A (explaining that students with disabilities tend to be stigmatized and 
are disproportionately subject to victimization by peers). 
34 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the state tort theory of negligent supervision and 
instances where peer-inflicted injuries may violate a school’s duty to adequately supervise 
its students). 
35 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing § 1983 case law and instances in which victims 
attempted to utilize this cause of action in order to hold schools accountable). 
36 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing Title IX case law and attempts to hold schools liable for 
injuries with some sort of sexual element, as well as IDEA case law and attempts to hold 
schools liable under the theory that injuries inflicted by fellow students is a denial of a free 
and appropriate education). 
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A. Children with Disabilities:  Easy Targets for Peer-Inflicted Injury 
Public schools have become a hostile environment where violence 
and harassment are common.37  Nearly one out of every three students 
feels unsafe while at school.38  Much of the violence and harassment is 
the result of peer-on-peer abuse—a type of abuse that has a significant 
emotional and developmental impact on the victim.39  The problem is 
                                                 
37 Robert L. Phillips, Peer Abuse in Public Schools:  Should Schools Be Liable for Student to 
Student Injuries Under Section 1983?, 1995 BYU L. REV. 237, 250 (1995).  According to a 
recent U.S.A. Today poll, “[m]ost students knew someone who had brought a weapon to 
school.  Fifty percent said they knew someone who had switched schools to feel safer.”  Id.  
Additionally, according to an American Association University of Women (“AAUW”) 
survey, “[e]ighty-five percent of girls . . . reported ‘unwanted and unwelcome sexual 
behavior [at school] that interferes with their lives.’”  Id.  Others report the same 
phenomenon.  See Helena K. Dolan, Note, The Fourth R—Respect:  Combatting Peer Sexual 
Harassment in the Public Schools, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 215, 216 (1994) (explaining that school 
sexual harassment poses a unique threat in secondary, intermediate, and elementary 
schools because students are both the victims and the perpetrators); Adam Michael 
Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun ‘Cause Help Ain’t Comin:  The Need for Constitutional 
Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE L.J. 588, 589 (1993) (noting that it is 
becoming increasingly common for students to suffer attacks at the hands of their peers).  
For example, Phoebe Prince, a teenager, hanged herself as the result of relentless taunting 
and bullying that occurred over a period of three months during and after school hours.  
Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 6 Teenagers Are Charged After Classmate’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 29, 2010, at A14.  Further investigation revealed that certain “teachers, administrators 
and . . . staff members . . . were aware of the harassment,” yet did nothing to stop it.  Id.  
Still, as noted by the district attorney on the case, while the inaction of school officials was 
disturbing, it was not a violation of any law.  Id.  Surprisingly, the district attorney did 
charge several of Prince’s peers with felony charges including “violation[s] of civil rights 
with bodily injury, harassment, [and] stalking.”  Id.  Eckholm and Zezima explain that 
these “charges were an unusually sharp legal response to the problem of adolescent 
bullying, which is increasingly conducted in cyberspace as well as in the schoolyard and 
has drawn growing concern from parents, educators and lawmakers.”  Id. 
38 Phillips, supra note 37, at 250. 
39 See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment—Interference with an Equal Educational 
Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (explaining the 
educational and emotional impact that harassment creates).  Harassment can have an 
educational impact, with victims not wanting to attend school, refusing to speak in class, 
finding it more difficult to pay attention, and receiving lower grades.  Id.  Harassment can 
also have an emotional impact, with victims feeling embarrassed, self-conscious, and less 
confident.  Id.; see also Dolan, supra note 37, at 216 (discussing the frequency and emotional 
impact of peer-on-peer sexual abuse and noting that it occurs more often than teacher-to-
student abuse and has more severe consequences); Greenfield, supra note 37, at 589 (noting 
that the “long-standing problem” of peer-on-peer harassment ranges from “physical and 
verbal abuse, sexual assaults and harassment, stabbings, shootings, and attacks on mentally 
handicapped students”).  Dolan also explains that nearly all sexual harassment complaints 
in schools state that the harassment or abuse took place in public view, yet school 
personnel are rarely found to take preventative action.  Dolan, supra note 37, at 224.  But see 
Editorial, Education Poll Results Tough to Put into Play, HERALD-TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, available 
at http://www.allbusiness.com/education-training/education-systems-institutions/12839 
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heightened for students with disabilities, as they are disproportionately 
subjected to injury and victimization by their peers.40  For example, a 
thirteen-year old special needs student in Texas was raped twice in one 
day by classmates—first in the boys’ restroom, and then again in the 
school stairway.41  The school responded by covering up the incident and 
telling the victim “to go back to class and deal with the problem.”42  In 
Mississippi, a young deaf boy was sexually molested by a classmate on 
school grounds.43  The boys were initially separated after the incident; 
but soon thereafter, the school was forced to end the separation and the 
same classmate again assaulted the young boy.44  In Ohio, an autistic boy 
was repeatedly bullied and harassed by several of his peers, including 
                                                                                                             
343-1.html (commenting on lack of funding in public schools today).  Commentators often 
blame lack of funding for the inadequate training of teachers necessary to prevent violence 
in schools.  See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., WIDE SCOPE, QUESTIONABLE QUALITY:  THREE REPORTS 
FROM THE STUDY ON SCHOOL VIOLENCE & PREVENTION 7 (Oct. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/studies-school-violence/3-exec-sum.pdf 
(explaining that funding and resources are essential to ensure that teachers are properly 
trained and that programs are in place to prevent violence). 
40 See Bonnie Bell Carter & Vicky G. Spencer, The Fear Factor:  Bullying and Students with 
Disabilities, 21 INT’L J. SPECIAL EDUC. 11, 20–21 (2006), available at 
http://www.forockids.org/PDF%20Docs/Bullying.pdf (noting that various studies 
indicate that students with disabilities, particularly those that are visible, experience more 
bullying than their non-disabled peers in the form of physical attacks, extreme verbal 
aggression, and other threats).  This article, which relies on approximately eleven studies, 
cites the need for additional research in order to further examine the effects of bullying on 
students with disabilities.  Id. at 21.  It also explains that this type of abuse puts disabled 
students at an even further disadvantage to their non-disabled peers in addition to the 
already existing disadvantages of most disabilities.  Id. at 21–22; see also Kathleen Conn, 
Bullying and Harassment:  Can IDEA Protect Special Students?, 239 EDUC. L. REP. 789, 789–90 
(2009) (discussing how students with disabilities are more likely to be bullied, harassed, 
and abused by peers at school); David Ellis Ferster, Note, Deliberately Different:  Bullying as a 
Denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, 43 GA. L. REV. 191, 199 (2008) (“Students with disabilities are particularly vulnerable to 
bullying.”); Lauren Lambert, Note, Discrimination and Developmental Delays:  A Failing Grade 
in the Public Schools, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2005) (suggesting that disabled students 
are targeted for acts of violence because they are often unable to speak or effectively 
communicate to express their emotions or report abuse).  Lambert also explains that there 
is hardly any case law in the arena of peer-on-peer harassment of disabled students 
because victims often choose not to sue over the all too common instances of abuse.  Id. at 
553.  Lambert further notes that discrimination against disabled students runs rampant and 
often goes unnoticed in society.  Id.  As a result, there has been very little written on the 
topic of peer-on-peer harassment of disabled students in public schools.  Id. 
41 See Karen Mellencamp Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment:  Finding a 
Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123, 1123 (1994) 
(discussing the facts of the incident).  The parents filed the lawsuit against the school 
district, school officials, alleged attackers, and their parents.  Id. at 1123 n.6. 
42 Id. 
43 Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
44 Id. at 1300. 
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several instances of physical assault.45  School officials not only ignored 
the bullying, claiming it was simply part of a disciplinary system where 
older students hazed younger students, but they also failed to get the 
boy proper medical attention after acts of abuse.46 
Rape, molestation, and other forms of abuse are widespread in 
classrooms, hallways, and playgrounds across the United States, and 
disabled students are commonly the target.47  Mencap, a leading 
foundation for learning disability awareness in the United Kingdom, 
recently revealed that eight out of ten children with disabilities are 
subject to harassment by their peers.48  This disproportionate level of 
victimization is due to the fact that, unlike regular students, students 
with disabilities may stand out in terms of physical characteristics.49  
Students with disabilities may also exhibit a lack of social awareness that 
can also make them susceptible to victimization.50  Additionally, 
                                                 
45 M.Y. ex rel. Yorkavitz v. Grand River Acad., No. 1:09 CV 2884, 2010 WL 2195650, at *1 
(N.D. Ohio May 28, 2010). 
46 Id.  School officials also disciplined the victim for the repeated assaults.  Id. 
47 See Lambert, supra note 40, at 552–53 (explaining that schools are “obvious and fertile 
arena[s] for peer-to-peer harassment” of disabled students). 
48 “Don’t Stick It, Stop It!” Campaign Information, MENCAP, http://www.dontstickit.org. 
uk/campaign_information.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).  Mencap interviewed over five 
hundred children and young people with disabilities throughout England, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland.  Id.  The organization came to the conclusion that nearly all of these 
children are subject to bullying and abuse because of their disabilities.  Id.  As such, 
Mencap instituted the “Don’t Stick it, Stop it!” campaign to help children cope with the 
issue.  Welcome to Mencap’s Campaign Against Bullying, MENCAP, http://www.dontstickit. 
org.uk/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).  A study of fifty-four middle school students 
from a suburban Minnesota town compared the number of times disabled students 
reported bullying or harassment with the number of times their regular education 
counterparts reported the same.  Eric J. Carlson, Michelle Crow Flannery & Melissa 
Steinbring Kral, Differences in Bully/Victim Problems Between Early Adolescents with Learning 
Disabilities and Their Non-Disabled Peers, UNIV. OF WIS.-RIVER FALLS 19 (Apr. 30, 2005), 
http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED490374.pdf.  Results of the study demonstrated that students 
in special education programs experience significantly more incidents of bullying by peers 
than children in regular education programs.  Id. 
49 See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1079, 1090 (2002) (“[O]bservations from daily life show that disability harassment occurs 
constantly at school.”); Ferster, supra note 40, at 193 (stating that “[c]hildren with 
disabilities, who often stand out due to unique physical and mental characteristics, are 
particularly vulnerable” to abuse by their peers); see also Telephone Interview with Corry 
Smith, Special Education Resource Instructor, Woodland Elementary School in Gages Lake, 
Ill. (Feb. 1, 2010) (explaining that one difficulty of mainstreaming special education 
students into regular education classrooms continues to be special education students’ 
interactions with their regular education counterparts). 
50 See Carter & Spencer, supra note 40, at 12 (explaining that students with disabilities 
such as “learning disabilities, emotional disorders, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
and physical disabilities often demonstrate a lack of social awareness which may make 
them more vulnerable to victimization”); see also Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 
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students with disabilities are stigmatized and frequently referred to by 
their peers with derogatory and insulting terms such as “retarded” 
because they appear and act differently than other students.51  It is clear 
that peers view students with disabilities as easy targets.52 
Studies also show that violent, aggressive behavior increases when 
school rules and restrictions are unclear, when discipline is lax, and 
when teachers fail to effectively monitor students’ behavior or protect 
the “weaker students in the school.”53  Thus, it is critical for schools to 
adequately supervise students with disabilities to protect them from peer 
                                                                                                             
848 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting a disabled student who was educationally mentally impaired 
displayed Down Syndrome-like characteristics when she would inappropriately hug other 
children and adults). 
51 See Weber, supra note 49, at 1091 (“The word ‘retard’ has become a common insult on 
and off the playground.”); Lambert, supra note 40, at 551–52 (explaining the word 
“retarded” is socially acceptable in society, particularly in schools, and results in prejudice, 
discrimination, and harassment); John C. McGinley, Spread the Word to End the Word, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 2, 2010, 06:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-c-
mcginley/spread-the-word-to-end-th_b_483157.html (discussing the interplay between use 
of the word “retarded” and First Amendment rights).  While every American has the right 
to use the word, McGinley suggests that the consequences for doing so should be 
analogous to using other hateful language, such racial slurs, sexist epithets, and 
homophobic terms.  Id.  He further explains that the r-word is a source of pain that 
“demeans a group that is not in a position to defend itself and who . . . never did anything 
to merit this kind of derision.”  Id.  McGinley urges society to use heightened sensitivity 
and compassion towards use of the word and to think about “the way we treat, regard and 
address the special needs population.”  Id.; see also Maria King Carroll, Op-Ed., New Rule:  A 
Word We Should Despise, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-
03-27/news/0903260596_1_intellectual-disabilities-word-describes (discussing the Special 
Olympics’ “Spread the Word to End the Word” campaign, a campaign launched on March 
31, 2009 in order to end the use of the word “retard”).  Carroll suggests that the “R-word” 
should be abolished, as it is an awful term that connotes that a person is defective or 
stupid.  Id.  She also believes that ending the use of this word is a step in the right direction 
towards humanizing the world for disabled persons.  Id. 
52 See Weber, supra note 49, at 1081 (noting that “much disability discrimination is the 
overt expression of hostility and the conscious effort to subordinate members of a group 
with less power and social standing than the majority” and “[n]owhere is the injury more 
common or more severe than in . . . schools.”); Ferster, supra note 40, at 199 (“[Students 
with disabilities] often look or act different than their peers as a result of their physical, 
intellectual, or emotional impairments, and these characteristics make them natural targets 
for harassment.”). 
53 Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools:  The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and 
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641, 654 (2004) 
(suggesting that if teachers do not intervene, some students may deem this as permission to 
continue such attacks); Wayne N. Welsh, The Effects of School Climate on School Disorder, 567 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 88, 89–90 (2000) (stating that perceptions of disorder in 
schools has a resultant effect on student behavior); Lambert, supra note 40, at 566–67 
(discussing that school officials condone discrimination against disabled students by peers 
when they fail to take action).  Thus, the school officials themselves can foster an 
environment where harassment is seen as acceptable amongst students.  Id. at 567. 
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abuse, which is reasonably foreseeable to occur.54  Legal remedies should 
be available to victims in instances where the school condones such 
abuse and fails to protect its disabled students from this harm.55 
B. Traditional Legal Remedies Available 
When a victim seeks recovery for an injury caused by another 
student, courts commonly hold that the school is not liable for the 
actions of the offending student because the doctrine of respondeat 
superior does not apply between the school and the student.56  A school 
is not the insurer of students’ safety and cannot supervise all students’ 
activities and movements.57  Still, victims can potentially hold schools 
liable if the staff was negligent; for example, a school should be held 
liable if the teacher failed to adequately supervise the classroom or 
permitted the offending student to commit conduct reasonably 
foreseeable to injure other students.58  Many disabled students who 
suffer from peer-inflicted injuries at school have attempted to utilize a 
variety of statutes and causes of action to hold the schools and school 
officials liable.59  Regardless of which claims the disabled student brings, 
                                                 
54 See Weber, supra note 49, at 1084 (noting that both legal scholars and courts alike have 
failed to adequately consider bullying and its effects on students with disabilities); see also 
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 652 (emphasizing that the school must be the 
source of the solution because the school is the very place where the bullying occurs).  In 
fact, studies have demonstrated that children “may actually appreciate good supervision 
because it creates an atmosphere of safety.”  Id. 
55 See Bodensteiner, supra note 39, at 47 (“The prospect of liability will cause school 
officials to take more seriously their duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment 
and, when it occurs despite their best efforts, to respond promptly with appropriate 
corrective/remedial efforts.”); see also infra Part IV (recommending that courts treat the 
infliction of injury to special education students by their peers as foreseeable so that victims 
of peer-on-peer abuse have a viable remedy). 
56 See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of 
Higher Learning for Injuries Resulting from Lack or Insufficiency of Supervision, 38 A.L.R. 3d 830, 
§ 2b (1971) (stating that respondeat superior does not apply; therefore, liability of schools 
can only be found when a school breaches a duty owed to a student). 
57 See, e.g., Mirand v. City of New York, 736 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994) (explaining that, 
while schools are under a duty to adequately supervise students, they are not insurers of 
safety and cannot be expected to supervise or control all of their students’ actions); see also 
infra note 66 (discussing a school’s duties and the subsequent limitation on such duties).  
But see Frank J. Vandall, Undermining Torts’ Policies:  Products Liability Legislation, 30 AM. U. 
L. REV. 673, 697–98 (1981) (explaining that tort liability should be placed on the party best 
situated to prevent the harm). 
58 Korpela, supra note 56, § 5; see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing theories of negligent 
supervision). 
59 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643–44, 658–59 (noting that “[t]he 
nation needs a change in its current legal theories,” as many victims are unable to hold 
schools accountable under theories of negligent supervision, causes of action under Title 
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foreseeability is often the central issue.60  Students who are subject to 
harassment and assault by their peers on school grounds oftentimes will 
have no remedy against the school that allowed the injury to occur.61  
The following subsections discuss the different sources of law that 
victims have attempted to utilize and several cases in which these 
sources have been asserted.62 
1. Causes of Action Under Tort Theory of Negligent Supervision 
Students injured by their peers may bring claims under the theory of 
negligent supervision by the school.63  Some states, however, shield 
schools and school officials from liability at the outset by providing 
governmental immunity through tort claims acts.64  In the states that 
                                                                                                             
IX, or constitutional theories, and that even anti-bullying statutes fail to protect students 
from such harm); see also infra Part II.B (explaining the traditional legal remedies utilized). 
60 See, e.g., Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding 
“foreseeability cannot create an affirmative duty to protect” the victim when no custodial 
relationship is established); see also infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing how it 
is difficult to overcome the hurdle of foreseeability). 
61 Phillips, supra note 37, at 257.  While the injured student has a right against the peer 
that inflicted the injury, this remedy does nothing to ameliorate the school environment 
that could allow for future injuries and incidents to occur.  Id. at 257–58.  The public may 
oppose school liability believing that it would increase the costs of schools.  Id. at 258.  
Section 1983, however, was enacted to prevent this very type of harm—“a deprivation of 
federal rights due to local officials’ reluctance . . . to enforce the law.”  Id.  
62 See infra Part II.B (explaining the traditional legal remedies utilized). 
63 See Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 280–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009) (holding that the injury to a special needs student was reasonably foreseeable and 
that the school was liable under theory of negligent supervision); M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista 
Union Sch. Dist, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 685–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a school liable 
under a theory of negligent supervision for the injury of a special needs student); see also 
Todd A. DeMitchell & Thomas Carroll, A Duty Owed:  Tort Liability and the Perceptions of 
Public School Principals, 201 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6 n.34 (2005) (“In a nationwide study by LRP, 
negligent supervision accounted for 43% of the school negligence suits resulting in 
awards.”).  But see Weddle, Bullying in School, supra note 53, at 682–83 (“Tort theories are 
currently so lopsided in favor of schools that there can be no real fear of damage awards for 
ignoring best practices in the face of what schools should know is a dangerous and 
pervasive problem.”) (footnote omitted). 
64 See Daniel B. Weddle, Brutality and Blindness:  Bullying in Schools and Negligent 
Supervision by School Officials, in OUR PROMISE:  ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR 
AMERICA’S CHILDREN 385, 387 (Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319397 (noting that, under many 
state tort claims acts, “states shield schools and school officials from liability for negligence 
unless [their actions rise] to a level of recklessness or gross negligence”); Julie Sacks & 
Robert S. Salem, Victims Without Legal Remedies:  Why Kids Need Schools to Develop 
Comprehensive Anti-Bullying Policies, 72 ALB. L. REV. 147, 187 (2009) (noting that based on 
the “doctrine of sovereign immunity, school districts, as political subdivisions that perform 
government functions, are commonly immunized from civil suits for injuries, death, or 
property damage allegedly caused by the acts or omissions of the district or its employees” 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/8
2011] Holding Schools Liable for Peer-Inflicted Injuries 751 
allow the negligent supervision cause of action, plaintiffs must show the 
existence of the following elements:  (1) the school had a duty to 
supervise its students; (2) there was a breach of the duty by the teacher 
or school; (3) the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the 
student’s injury; and (4) the injury resulted in damages.65  Regarding the 
first essential element, courts have long held that schools have a duty to 
supervise children in their custody, although the scope of the duty may 
vary depending on the circumstances.66  The standard of care imposed 
                                                                                                             
and can escape liability from suit); Jill Grim, Note, Peer Harassment in Our Schools:  Should 
Teachers and Administrators Join in the Fight?, 10 BARRY L. REV. 155, 163 (2008) (stating that 
some courts simply dismiss tort claims against a school based on the principle of sovereign 
immunity).  For example, a Texas court concluded that school personnel were not liable for 
their negligence because they were immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act.  
Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1987).  In Hopkins, an 
elementary student that suffered from cerebral palsy was left unsupervised and students 
proceeded to push her into a stack of chairs.  Id. at 617.  She sustained a head injury, 
resulting in a mild convulsion.  Id.  The student was dazed and incoherent, yet the teacher 
did not contact the student’s doctors or mother and the student later suffered severe 
convulsions on the bus.  Id. at 617–18.  She was then dropped off at a day care center where 
she finally received medical treatment.  Id. at 618.  Still, the court determined that the 
school was entitled to immunity, leaving the victim without a remedy.  Id. at 619.  The 
Eleventh Amendment establishes the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (explaining that, as a result of the 
passage of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court may not hear a suit against a state 
without the state’s consent).  This immunity from suit—called sovereign immunity—can be 
waived, but the state must unequivocally express its desire to waive its immunity.  Id. at 99. 
65 See Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 391.  Weddle breaks down the 
generally accepted definition of negligent supervision, as follows:  “(1) The existence of a 
teacher-student relationship giving rise to a legal duty to supervise; (2) the negligent breach 
of that duty by the teacher; and (3) proximate causation of the student’s injury by the 
teacher’s negligence.”  Id.  Weddle also explains that this definition is not limited to 
teachers, but can be extended to all school employees.  Id.; see also Todd A. DeMitchell, 
Essay:  Safety Sensitive Positions and the Duty Owed to Students:  From Drugs to Torts, 217 
EDUC. L. REP. 789, 798 (2009) (“Public schools owe a duty to use ordinary care and to take 
reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to students thereby providing a safe school 
environment.” (footnote omitted)); Korpela, supra note 56, § 2[a] (discussing peer-inflicted 
injuries in school and noting that, “while the cases do not appear to be entirely consistent, 
there is authority imposing liability upon school agencies where there was evidence 
warranting a finding that the occurrence was reasonably foreseeable and could have been 
prevented by adequate supervision”). 
66 See, e.g., Mirand v. City of New York, 736 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994) (“Schools are 
under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held 
liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.” 
(citations omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) (explaining the 
“duty of [a] person having custody of another to control conduct of third persons” (title 
capitalization omitted) and suggesting that schools, institutions that take custody of 
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upon school personnel in carrying out the duty is the degree of care that 
a person of ordinary prudence, charged with comparable duties, would 
exercise under the circumstances.67  Additionally, many commentators 
and authorities, particularly a recently proposed final draft to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, have even expanded upon the duty, 
suggesting that a school has an affirmative duty to protect students from 
                                                                                                             
children during school hours, should have such a duty).  The Restatement states the 
following: 
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the 
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of 
his normal power of self-protection or to subject him to association 
with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from 
intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to 
create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor 
 (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control 
the conduct of the third persons, and 
 (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for 
exercising such control. 
Id.  In addition, comment (a) specifically explains that “[t]he rule stated in this Section is 
applicable to . . . teachers or other persons in charge of a public school [or] . . . a private 
school.”  Id. § 320 cmt. a; Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 392 (explaining 
that drafts of Restatement (Third) of Torts section 40 validates the theory that schools have 
a duty to adequately supervise students, a duty that includes protecting students from the 
tortuous acts of other students).  Weddle notes that the duty varies in scope, depending on 
“the age and maturity of the children being supervised.”  Id.  But see DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198–202 (1989) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to protect a child 
from harm inflicted by the actions of a third party, absent some type of special relationship 
or circumstance); Grim, supra note 64, at 164 (explaining that while schools have a duty to 
supervise, they do not have a duty to protect their students).  Still, she suggests that, as the 
Constitution was written before school attendance became mandatory, or even very 
common, “[t]he lack of duty for educators to protect students against other students seems 
inconsistent now that school attendance is compulsory in every state.”  Id. at 163.  Grim 
also elaborates that there is only so much a parent can do for her child once she enters the 
schoolhouse gates, and thus, general tort principles suggest that the official taking custody 
of the child should give her the same type of protection that she is being deprived of while 
separated from her parent.  Id. at 164; Phillips, supra note 37, at 253 (explaining that while 
there is an established duty to supervise students, the Supreme Court has yet to determine 
that there is a similar duty to protect students from harm of third parties). 
67 See 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 502 (2010) (“In other words, the standard of 
care of teachers is that of an ordinary, prudent, or reasonable person in such a position 
acting under similar circumstances.”); see also Ralph D. Mawdsley, Standard of Care for 
Students with Disabilities:  The Intersection of Liability Under the IDEA and Tort Theories, 2010 
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 359, 359 (explaining that the responsibility of public schools to provide 
students with disabilities certain services pursuant to the IDEA “intersects with [the] 
schools’ obligation to protect students from harm”).  Mawdsley explains that many schools 
now have detailed knowledge of a disabled student’s needs and behaviors as a result of the 
student’s IEP.  Id.  This creates an issue as to whether this knowledge affects the duty or 
standard of care that the school owes its disabled students with IEPs.  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/8
2011] Holding Schools Liable for Peer-Inflicted Injuries 753 
the risk of harm stemming from the school’s special relationship with its 
student.68 
To determine whether a school breached its duty to supervise when 
a peer or third party inflicts an injury and to satisfy the second and third 
elements of a negligence claim, the victim must establish that the 
school’s action was (1) the proximate cause of the injury; and (2) that the 
school authorities had specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous 
conduct that caused the injury.69  In other words, third party acts must 
have been reasonably foreseeable.70  The foreseeability requirement is a 
difficult hurdle to overcome because courts tend to presume that injuries 
inflicted by third parties are generally not foreseeable.71 
                                                 
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(a), (b)(5) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).  The 
Restatement suggests that a school is in a special relationship with its students, which gives 
rise to “a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the 
relationship.”  Id. § 40(a); see also supra note 66 (discussing the Restatement approach). 
69 See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 780 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) 
(“Where . . . the underlying injury is caused by the intentional act of a fellow student, the 
‘plaintiff [must] demonstrate, by the school’s prior knowledge or notice of the dangerous 
conduct which caused the injury, that the acts of the fellow student[] could have reasonably 
been anticipated.”) (quoting Druba v. East Greenbrush Cent. School Dist., 734 N.Y.S.2d 331, 
332 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)).  Another New York court, using Mirand v. City of New York to 
support its decision, stated that 
[i]n determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision 
has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow 
students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently 
specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused 
injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been 
anticipated. 
Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) 
(quoting Mirand, 637 N.E.2d at 266); see also Korpela, supra note 56, § 2[b] (explaining that 
defendant schools often utilize these requirements as defenses to liability, as plaintiffs 
generally have a difficult time providing proof of these elements).  Schools often claim that 
the independent act of the perpetrating student, rather than negligent supervision, is the 
proximate cause of the injury and that the occurrence of the injury itself was not reasonably 
foreseeable.  Id. 
70 See Doe, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (reiterating that the act of the third party must have been 
reasonably anticipated or foreseen); Korpela, supra note 56, § 2[b] (explaining the need for a 
victim to prove that the injury was foreseeable). 
71 See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 501 (2010) (“[A]n 
injury caused by the impulsive, unanticipated act of a fellow student ordinarily will not 
give rise to a finding of negligence absent proof of prior conduct that would have put a 
reasonable person on notice to protect against the injury-causing act.”); see also Weddle, 
Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683 (explaining that issues with foreseeabilty and 
causation make it very difficult for these student victims to obtain remedies).  But see 
Matthew Earhart, Note, Bullying:  What’s Being Done and Why Schools Aren’t Doing More, 25 
J. JUV. L. 26, 29 (2005) (noting that several school districts and state legislatures have passed 
anti-bullying policies and legislation, which suggests that these schools and states believe 
that bullying is not only prevalent, but also foreseeable and should be prevented); Lambert, 
supra note 40, at 569 (explaining that injuries to developmentally delayed or disabled 
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Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City School District demonstrates the 
difficulty victims face in establishing the foreseeability requirement.72  In 
Marshall, the parents of a special education student alleged that the 
school negligently supervised their daughter after another student 
murdered her on school grounds.73  The perpetrator, a fellow special 
education student, made several threats during the year.74  Still, the court 
determined that the school district was not liable because, despite the 
prior threats against the deceased by the student who ultimately 
murdered her, the injury was not foreseeable since the threats did not 
sufficiently put the school on notice that the perpetrator was dangerous 
and needed extra monitoring.75 
On the other hand, some courts, particularly in California, have 
demonstrated a new trend in which the injury inflicted upon a special 
needs student by a peer is deemed foreseeable.76  For example, in M.W. v. 
Panama Buena Vista Union School, the California Court of Appeals held a 
school liable for injury to a special education student under a theory of 
negligent supervision.77  In M.W., a special education student known to 
be a disciplinary threat lured another special education student into a 
restroom and sexually assaulted him.78  Teachers and school officials 
were unaware this assault occurred.79  Due to “the foreseeability of harm 
                                                                                                             
students at school are foreseeable given their unique characteristics).  The safety of disabled 
students depends in large part on the school placing them in a safe environment with 
adequate supervision.  Id.  It is reasonable to find injuries to disabled students foreseeable 
when supervision is lacking.  Id. 
72 697 N.Y.S.2d at 395. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 396.  The student’s murder took place during lunch and occurred outside of the 
school building in a wooded area on the school property.  Id. at 395. 
75 Id. at 396.  The court specifically noted that “[a]ctual or constructive notice to the 
school of prior conduct is generally required because, obviously, school personnel cannot 
reasonably be expected to take guard against all of the sudden, spontaneous acts that take 
place.”  Id. (quoting Mirand v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994)).  The 
court concluded that the student’s statement to a teacher that he intended to “stick his 
girlfriend . . . with a needle and try killing her” did not constitute specific knowledge 
necessary for such a murder to have been reasonably anticipated under the circumstances.  
Id.  Furthermore, the court was “unpersuaded” by the plaintiff’s argument that the school 
owed a higher duty of care to the student simply because she was a disabled student.  Id. 
76 See, e.g., Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 280–82 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008) (holding that it was reasonably foreseeable that a special needs student would 
be vulnerable to injury at the hands of a peer); M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista Union Sch., 1 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 673, 685–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a school liable under a theory of 
negligent supervision because the injury inflicted upon a special needs student was 
foreseeable). 
77 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 685–86. 
78 Id. at 676–77. 
79 Id. at 677. 
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to special education students, the well-settled statutory duty of school 
districts to take all reasonable steps to protect them . . . and the 
paramount policy concern of providing our children with safe learning 
environments,” the school district was held liable for an injury inflicted 
upon a student with disabilities.80 
Similarly, in Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, the 
California Court of Appeals reiterated that “[g]iven the unique 
vulnerability of ‘special needs’ students, it is foreseeable that they may 
be victimized by other students.”81  In Jennifer C., the victim was a special 
needs student who was sexually assaulted by another special needs 
student during a lunch break.82  The court began its analysis by noting 
that, while the law in regard to special needs children is emerging, it is 
obvious that these students are uniquely vulnerable to threats by their 
peers, particularly in an area that the school knew to be hidden from 
sight.83  Therefore, the court held the school liable for negligent 
supervision, as it was reasonably foreseeable that this victim would be 
exposed to harm by a fellow student.84 
Nonetheless, success under theories of negligent supervision is still 
rare, as most courts, unlike those in California, maintain that injuries 
                                                 
80 Id. at 683.  The court further articulated that the school should be held liable because 
“[t]he assault occurred on the school’s watch, while the student was entrusted to the 
school’s care.  It was substantially caused by the school’s indifference toward the dangers 
posed by failing to adequately supervise its students, particularly special education 
students.”  Id. at 675.  Still, the dissent in M.W. critiqued the majority’s decision, claiming 
that the focus centered on the victim’s status without adequately considering the 
foreseeability of the particular type of harm that was inflicted.  Id. at 686 (Levy, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent also argued that “[t]he majority’s contrary position expands the 
concept of duty to the point of essentially imposing strict liability on school districts for the 
criminal conduct of any student with a discipline record that includes hitting and kicking 
other students.”  Id. 
81 Jennifer C., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 281.  As a preface to the case, the court noted that 
[a] “special needs” child, i.e. a child suffering from mental and/or 
physical disability, cannot reasonably be expected to take care of 
himself or herself.  Such a child at public school needs help and 
protection.  This case illustrates the unique vulnerability of such a 
child and the unique responsibility of a school district to such a child. 
Id. at 278. 
82 Id. at 278.  The victim was a fourteen-year-old middle school student with disabilities, 
suffering from hearing problems, aphasia, emotional problems, and cognitive difficulties.  
Id.  The perpetrator, another special needs student whom the victim did not know, led her 
across campus to the hidden alcove and committed the assault.  Id.  While the alcove was 
not visible from the school grounds, any person walking past the school would see it.  Id.  
The assault was reported by a parent walking along the sidewalk past the school.  Id. 
83 Id. at 280. 
84 Id. at 280–82. 
Smith: Fighting Back: How Students with Disabilities Can Hold Schools Li
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
756 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
inflicted upon special education students by peers are not foreseeable.85  
Furthermore, some states prevent negligent supervision claims at the 
outset by shielding local government bodies from liability under state 
tort law.86  When local bodies are immune from tort law, students 
injured at school have attempted to bring statutory claims to recover 
damages.87 
2. Causes of Action Under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Section 1983 was originally passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 and has been expanded upon ever since its passage.88  The purpose 
of § 1983 is to provide a means of redress for individuals harmed by state 
actors.89  The first step in any § 1983 claim is to identify the constitutional 
                                                 
85 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining that foreseeabilty is a difficult 
element for a plaintiff to prove and that most courts reject the premise that peer-inflicted 
injuries are foreseeable). 
86 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing issues of sovereign immunity 
and tort claims acts that bar claims of negligence against school and school officials). 
87 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing statutory claims under § 1983). 
88 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Phillips, supra note 37, at 238.  Section 1983 was originally 
passed as part of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 
436 U.S. 658, 692 n.57 (1978).  Congress passed it with little dispute, so the legislative 
history is scarce.  Id.  Even though there is limited legislative history, the Supreme Court 
has concluded that one reason that Congress passed § 1983 was to afford individuals 
deprived of a federal right to a relief in federal courts when states or state officials are 
unwilling or unable to enforce the law.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled 
in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978).  Despite being passed in 
1871, § 1983 was essentially dormant for nearly a century until the Supreme Court, in 
Monroe v. Pape, held that § 1983 allowed plaintiffs to sue state officers for damages for 
actions taken “under color” of state law.  Id. at 187.  Although the Monroe Court gave an 
expansive interpretation to the phrase “under color of state law,” the Court still concluded 
that a municipality is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.  Id. at 191 n.50, 192.  In 
1978, however, the Supreme Court overruled this conclusion in Monell v. Department of 
Social Services when it held that a plaintiff may sue a municipality or other local 
government unit pursuant to § 1983.  436 U.S. at 690–91.  The Court made clear, however, 
that a municipality cannot be held liable unless the action that resulted in the alleged injury 
was done pursuant to official custom or policy.  Id. at 691.  Furthermore, the municipality 
cannot be held liable solely based upon the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of 
its employees.  Id.  Nevertheless, in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, the Supreme 
Court declined to expand § 1983 to hold states or its agencies liable under § 1983.  491 U.S. 
58, 66–67 (1989).  Therefore, if a plaintiff can prove that a school district is not a state actor 
or arm of the state, then the school may be subject to liability under § 1983.  Phillips, supra 
note 37, at 242. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  This statute states that 
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured. 
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right that was allegedly infringed.90  While it may sound simple, 
bringing a § 1983 claim has been analogized to “walking through a mine 
field:  [plaintiffs are] uncertain where to step next.”91  Plaintiffs often use 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides 
that states shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law,” as the source of law under which to bring a 
§ 1983 claim.92  No matter what theory the plaintiff pursues, in order to 
prevail the plaintiff must show a direct link between the policy or 
custom in question and the alleged injury.93  For peer-on-peer injuries, it 
is often difficult to show causation sufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim 
because the injury is inflicted by another student, not the school or 
school official.94  To compound the causation problem, the Supreme 
Court has held that the government has no affirmative duty to protect 
citizens from private actors.95  Likewise, nothing in the language of the 
Due Process Clause itself requires states to protect the life, liberty, and 
property of its citizens against invasions by private actors.96  The Due 
Process Clause is a limitation on states’ power to act, not a guarantee of 
certain minimal levels of safety and security.97 
Nevertheless, the Court conceded that causation problems can be 
overcome because there are particular situations in which “the 
Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and 
                                                                                                             
Id.  In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting 
under the color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.  Gomez v. Toledo, 446 
U.S. 635, 640 (1980).  The first step is to identify the specific constitutional right infringed.  
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (explaining that the plaintiff must allege a 
violation of either federal statutory law or constitutional law); Phillips, supra note 37, at 238 
(“Section 1983 jurisprudence is so complex that essential elements of a . . . claim are easily 
overlooked.”).  Aside from the sentence provided in title 42 of the United States Code, 
“Congress has given little guidance for section 1983 civil rights claims.  Thus, the meaning 
of section 1983 elements [has] been promulgated by the courts.”  Id. at 243.  The courts have 
interpreted the elements of the claim to require a person, acting under color of the state, to 
cause a deprivation of rights.  Id. 
90 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4. 
91 Phillips, supra note 37, at 266. 
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 249 (explaining that 
section 1983 cannot be used simply for a general injury, as it “is limited to deprivations of 
federal or constitutional rights”).  In peer-on-peer violence, it is common for victims to 
“claim a [constitutional] violation of bodily integrity.”  Id. 
93 Phillips, supra note 37, at 248. 
94 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“Congress did not intend 
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official policy of some nature 
caused a constitutional tort.”); see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 248 (explaining the 
difficulty of holding a school liable under § 1983 for the act of a third party). 
95 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989). 
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
97 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–202. 
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protection with respect to particular individuals.”98  The exception is 
applicable in two specific situations:  (1) circumstances in which the State 
has taken a person into full custody against his or her will, thus creating 
a “special relationship;”99 or (2) circumstances where the State has 
created the injury or harm, commonly known as the “state-created 
danger” exception.100  The Supreme Court addressed the special 
relationship exception in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services.101 
In DeShaney, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to protect a child from 
harm inflicted by the actions of another, absent some type of special 
circumstance.102  DeShaney involved a § 1983 action brought by the 
mother of a boy who had been beaten by his father.103  The mother filed 
                                                 
98 Id. at 198. 
99 Phillips, supra note 37, at 253 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–99, 201 n.9). 
100 See Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 910–11, 912–13 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that a plaintiff can succeed in a § 1983 action by proving a “special 
relationship” existed between the victim and the school or school officials or, alternatively, 
by proceeding under a “state-created danger theory”). 
101 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–202.  
102 Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 252–53 (explaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in DeShaney focused on the premises that if the state wanted the Department of Social 
Services (“DSS”) to be liable, it could have created a system under tort law to allow for 
such suits; and that if DSS had acted too quickly, the boy’s father could have argued it was 
a violation of his Due Process rights).  But see Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) 
(upholding a suspicionless school drug testing policy under the premise that a school’s 
interest in preventing drug use and establishing an environment conducive to learning 
outweighs a student’s interest in privacy).  In Earls, the Court contended that “[a] student’s 
privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for 
maintaining discipline, health, and safety.”  Id. at 830.  The Court further noted that to 
secure order in school and create an environment conducive to learning, “the school has 
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children.” Id. at 831 (quoting 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)).  In Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton, the Court upheld a school drug testing program that authorized 
random urinalysis sampling of student athletes.  515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995).  The Vernonia 
Court emphasized that the school’s custodial authority over students permits a “degree of 
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”  Id. at 655.  The Court 
further stated that an “educational environment requires close supervision of 
schoolchildren.”  Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339).  Earls and Vernonia suggest that the 
Supreme Court is more inclined to protect students from drug use than it is to protect 
students from physical abuse of others. 
103 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192–93.  DSS received several notifications about the abuse, and 
after the boy was admitted to the hospital with injuries inflicted by his father, DSS entered 
into an agreement with the father to allow him to take the boy home under certain 
conditions.  Id.  A DSS caseworker made several visits to the home, observed several 
suspicious injuries, noted that the boy was not placed in school as the father had agreed to 
do, and noted that the father had still not complied with the agreement.  Id.  Then the father 
beat the boy so ruthlessly that he suffered severe brain damage that rendered him 
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the claim against the social workers and local officials who had received 
numerous complaints about the abuse but refused to remove the boy 
from his father’s custody.104  The Court found that the State was not 
liable, even though it knew about the father’s abuse, because it did not 
create the harm and did not restrict the boy from acting on his own 
behalf.105  It elaborated that no special relationship existed between the 
State and the boy simply because the State had knowledge of the 
abuse.106  DeShaney’s rule and exceptions have had important 
implications in the public school context, as courts often cite DeShaney as 
controlling precedent to deny that the special relationship or state-
created harm existed, even though it is a child-welfare case.107 
a. The DeShaney Special Relationship Exception 
There is a very narrow class of people who stand in a “special 
relationship” with a state.108  Public schools are under no constitutional 
obligation to protect school students from the actions of private parties 
                                                                                                             
profoundly mentally disabled.  Id. at 193.  Nonetheless, the Court held that the state 
officials could not be held liable.  Id. at 203. 
104 Id. at 193. 
105 Id. at 201.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the government 
played no role in creating the dangers faced by the young boy and further the government 
did not make the child more vulnerable.  Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Phillips, supra note 37, at 253.  “Courts have been reluctant to extend the special 
relationship doctrine to public schools.”  Id.; see also, e.g., Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 
28 F.3d 521, 528–29 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the DeShaney special relationship doctrine 
before holding that a school had no affirmative duty under § 1983 to protect a student 
killed by random gunfire in its parking lot after a non-mandatory school dance); Graham v. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994–95 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding no custodial 
relationship exists between schools and students; thus, a school district has no affirmative 
duty to protect students from other students, even if the school had warnings of threatened 
violence). 
108 Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 185 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2006).  In Teague, 
the court explained that in order “[t]o secure liability against the state for private harm 
under section 1983, plaintiffs must show that their claims fit within the narrow class of 
exceptions to the DeShaney rule.”  Id.  In Walton v. Alexander, the Fifth Circuit declined to 
find a special relationship where a deaf student had been sexually abused by a peer at his 
Mississippi school.  44 F.3d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).  The plaintiff was attacked 
twice and sued the superintendent under § 1983 for failure to protect.  Id. at 1299–1300.  The 
court found the school owed the plaintiff no duty to protect him from third party harms.  
Id. at 1300–01; see also Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 182 (noting that even though schools 
have a substantial amount of control over students in their custody during the school day, 
most courts refuse to find that a special relationship is created as a result of this custody).  
Sacks and Salem also note that “[c]ourts likewise reject application of the state-created-
danger exception because administrators’ failure to intervene in harassment is not the same 
as actively encouraging pre-existing behaviors.”  Id. at 182–83. 
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absent a special relationship between the student and school.109  The 
applicability of the special relationship doctrine in the public school 
context is a question left open by DeShaney.110  Victims assert that 
compulsory school laws and in loco parentis standing create a special 
relationship between the school and student falling within the DeShaney 
exception.111 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Teague, 185 F. App’x. at 357 (asserting that the plaintiff failed to state a proper 
§ 1983 claim, as neither a special relationship nor a state-created danger existed as required 
by DeShaney); Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the student did not state a viable § 1983 claim because there was no special relationship 
formed between the student and the school); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 
732–34 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding the school had no duty to protect its students under 
DeShaney and that the school was not liable under § 1983); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the premise 
that the school could be held liable under § 1983); Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist., 53 
F. Supp. 2d 787, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Total and exclusive custody, not mere restraint, is at 
the heart of a due process claim relying upon a special relationship.”); see also Conn, supra 
note 40, at 791 (stating that the consequences of the courts’ failure to find the existence of a 
special relationship between a school and students, as well as the courts’ failure to find any 
type of state-created danger, unless the harm is so severe that it shocks the conscience of 
the court, have led to several harsh decisions); Laura Oren, Some Thoughts on the State-
Created Danger Doctrine:  DeShaney is Still Wrong and Castle Rock is More of the Same, 16 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (noting that out of twenty-one recent appellate 
cases, only two survived the state-created danger test). 
110 Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522, 1523, 1526–27 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that an eight-
year old deaf student who resided at the Georgia School of the Deaf had a special 
relationship with the school, but that the school officials were entitled to qualified 
immunity because the law on what constitutes a special relationship was not clearly 
established); see also Dolan, supra note 37, at 228–29 (discussing the application of the 
special relationship doctrine following DeShaney and noting that the DeShaney Court did 
not provide definite guidance).  Most courts, nonetheless, decline to find a special 
relationship between a student and an ordinary public school.  Id.  Still, there is a trend for 
courts to find that residential schools, schools that maintain custody of students during the 
week and provides for students’ basic needs, have an affirmative duty to protect students.  
Id. at 231. 
111 See supra note 109 (providing an overview of cases where victims were unable to 
prove the requisite special relationship); see also Conn, supra note 40, at 790–91 (suggesting 
that causes of action under § 1983 are typically ineffective); Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 
182–83 (noting that despite schools’ substantial control over students, courts generally 
reject § 1983 claims); Alison Bethel, Note, Keeping Schools Safe:  Why Schools Should Have an 
Affirmative Duty to Protect Students from Harm by Other Students, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 183, 185–86 
(2004) (noting “the majority view that schools do not have an affirmative duty under the 
Due Process Clause to protect students from harm by other students.”); Grim, supra note 
64, at 164 (arguing that because school attendance is compulsory in every state, it makes 
little sense that schools do not have a duty to protect their students from injuries inflicted 
by other students).  But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(a), (b)(5) (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1 2005) (“An actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of 
reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship.  Special 
relationships [give] rise to the duty [of reasonable care within the relationship of] a school 
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Victims argue that compulsory school laws, which require students 
to attend school and hold students in class against their will, create the 
type of special relationship prescribed by the DeShaney standard.112  The 
state arguably cultivates a special relationship with the child by 
compelling a child to attend school.113  Students are unable to walk off 
the school’s premises during school hours without permission, which 
                                                                                                             
with its students.”) (internal numbering system omitted).  In addition, the comment (l) 
asserts that 
[t]he affirmative duty imposed on schools in this Section is in addition 
to the ordinary duty of a school to exercise reasonable care in its 
operations for the safety of its students.  The relationship between a 
school and its students parallels aspects of several other special 
relationships—it is a custodian of students, it is a land possessor who 
opens the premises to a significant public population, and it acts 
partially in the place of parents.  The Second Restatement of Torts 
contained no Section that specifically identified the school-student 
relationship as special.  However, a generally ignored passage in § 320, 
Comment b, which imposed an affirmative duty on custodians to 
control third persons, observes that the custodial relationship is also 
applicable to schools and their students.  Despite the Second 
Restatement’s limited treatment of affirmative duties by schools, such 
a duty has enjoyed substantial acceptance among courts. 
Id. § 40 cmt. l. 
112 See, e.g., Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1376 (finding that no special relationship existed 
between the student and the school). 
113 See Davis, supra note 41, at 1135 (expanding upon the argument for finding a special 
relationship between a school and student under the compulsory education argument).  
According to Davis, the most logical conclusion is that when a school maintains custody of 
a student, the school should be required to act reasonably and protect the student from 
peer abuse.  Id.  Furthermore, Davis suggests that if parents cannot be certain that their 
children will be watched in school, then the parents are failing to fulfill their legal and 
moral duties to supervise by sending the children to school each day.  Id.  In  Doe v. Taylor 
Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit once elaborated upon this idea, stating that 
[p]arents, guardians, and the children themselves have little choice but 
to rely on the school officials for some measure of protection and 
security while in school and can reasonably expect that the state will 
provide a safe school environment.  To hold otherwise would call into 
question the constitutionality of compulsory attendance statutes, for 
we would be permitting a state to compel parents to surrender their 
offspring to the tender mercies of school officials without exacting 
some assurance from the state that school officials will undertake the 
role of guardian that parents might not otherwise relinquish, even 
temporarily. 
975 F.2d. 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 987 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Dolan, supra note 37, at 236 (arguing that 
compulsory school attendance should be recognized as a special relationship because 
similar to foster care, the state’s affirmative act of requiring school attendance places a 
significant number of children in state approved schools).  Students during the school day 
rely on the school to provide a reasonably safe environment, a basic need recognized in 
DeShaney.  Id. at 237. 
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prevents students from removing themselves from dangerous 
situations.114  Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Torts specifically 
lists “a school with its students” as an example of a type of special 
relationship.115 
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit rejected a claim by a special 
education student who was sexually assaulted and raped by a fellow 
student because “[p]ublic school attendance does not render a child’s 
guardians unable to care for the child’s basic needs,” and no special 
relationship exists between the school and the student.116  In Doe v. 
Hillsboro Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit refused “to hold that 
compulsory attendance laws alone create a special relationship.”117  
Among the many courts that have also considered the issue of whether a 
special relationship exists due to compulsory school attendance laws, 
nearly all have refused to find that such a relationship exists.118  Most 
courts conclude that attending an educational school program for seven 
hours a day is not similar to the restraints imposed by prisons and 
mental institutions, both of which currently are sufficient to establish the 
existence of a special relationship.119 
                                                 
114 See Dolan, supra note 37, at 236 (advocating for the position that schools have 
sufficient control over students under compulsory attendance laws for courts to find a 
special relationship between the student and school). 
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(b)(5). 
116 Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993).  In Dorothy J., a 
mentally retarded student was sexually assaulted and raped by another special education 
student in the school shower.  Id. at 731.  The student brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that 
the school, as a state actor, failed to protect him from assault.  Id.; see also Phillips, supra 
note 37, at 260 (explaining that guardians are the primary care providers for children and 
no affirmative duty is assumed by the school). 
117 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).  In Hillsboro, the Fifth Circuit denied the 
claim of a thirteen-year-old who was raped by a school janitor as it found no special 
relationship existed between the student and the school.  Id. 
118 See, e.g., Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 732–34 (noting the fact that a child must attend public 
school does not make a child’s guardian incapable of caring for the child’s fundamental 
needs); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir. 
1992) (en banc) (holding that there was no custodial or special relationship created because 
the parents, not the state, remained the student’s primary caretaker). 
119 Hillsboro, 113 F.3d at 1415; see also Russell v. Fannin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 
1582 (N.D. Ga. 1992) aff’d without opinion, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The key concept is 
the exercise of dominion or restraint by the state.  The state must somehow significantly 
limit an individual’s freedom or impair his ability to act on his own before it can be 
constitutionally required to care and provide for that person.” (quoting Wideman v. 
Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035–36 (11th Cir. 1987))).  But see Pagano ex 
rel. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schs., 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing a 
duty of protection based on the special relationship doctrine between elementary school 
students who are required to attend school and the school they attend).  The Pagano court 
allowed the claim to go forward based on the special relationship doctrine that had been 
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Alternatively, victims contend that under the in loco parentis doctrine, 
school officials have undertaken a parental duty to oversee students in 
school, therefore creating a special relationship.120  The in loco parentis 
argument essentially is that the school has been given authority via state 
compulsory education laws, and therefore should be responsible during 
the school day while it maintains custody of the children.121  The 
argument requires courts to consider the particular circumstances to 
determine whether there was an affirmative duty, specifically focusing 
on the school’s control and the child’s dependency and vulnerability.122  
Proponents argue that schools have functional custody because when a 
student is in school, his ability to protect himself is restricted, as is his 
parents’ ability to intervene and protect him.123  When a school acts in its 
parens patriae capacity in caring for students, the school’s duty to the 
                                                                                                             
previously recognized in cases of institutionalized persons, incarcerated individuals, and 
foster care situations.  Id. 
120 See, e.g., Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s assertion that a special relationship existed based on the school’s in loco parentis 
status). 
121 See Phillips, supra note 37, at 256 (explaining the in loco parentis argument). 
122 See Dolan, supra note 37, at 234 (explaining that the factors that should be considered 
by the courts to determine if a special relationship exists include the following:  how 
vulnerable and dependent the student is at the time, whether the state has compulsory 
attendance laws, how mature the student is at the time, and the amount of discretion the 
school has in controlling the students); Phillips, supra note 37, at 256 (discussing factors 
which weigh in favor of finding a special relationship under the theory of in loco parentis). 
123 See Dolan, supra note 37, at 234 (comparing institutionalized persons and incarcerated 
individuals with school children as all are unable to protect themselves or provide for their 
own basic needs).  Public school children are in an environment at school where the state 
exercises some control over their liberty.  Id. at 235–36; see also Grim, supra note 64, at 160 
(finding irony in the Court’s findings that a custodial relationship exists between mental 
patients and hospital officials, as well as between prisoners and prison officials, but not 
between students and school officials).  A custodial relationship exists when individuals 
are held against their will such that the state interferes with the individuals’ ability to 
protect themselves.  Id.  Students are in a similar situation due to compulsory school laws.  
Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 256 (noting that the primary argument for finding a 
special relationship under the in loco parentis theory is that schools maintain control over 
their students).  Weddle reflects on the competing interests that result in the irony when he 
states that 
[w]hile there is something disturbing about the fact that the state 
can compel children to attend school yet not incur a duty to protect 
them from their peers, the Court’s approach actually makes a good 
deal of constitutional sense. . . . 
On the other hand, such a formulation ignores the significant 
disability placed upon school children, . . . [as they] must remain in the 
school where the torment is carried out, and the parents can do 
nothing to shield [them] from torment. 
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666. 
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students should increase because the school stands in the place of the 
parents and also acts as a part of the government.124 
Most courts determine that teachers have the authority to act in each 
child’s best interest but have no duty to do so.125  The reasoning for not 
finding a special relationship under in loco parentis is that the parents, not 
the State, remain the student’s primary caretaker.126  For example, in D.R. 
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, the Third Circuit held 
that school officials were not liable for the violent sexual assaults 
repeatedly inflicted upon a hearing-impaired student by her peers 
because her parents remained her primary caretaker; as such, no special 
relationship with the school existed under the in loco parentis theory.127 
b. DeShaney State-Created Danger Exception 
A second exception to the DeShaney standard occurs where the 
government created or enhanced the risk of harm.128  Several courts have 
recognized the state-created danger theory and established liability in 
cases where a state’s own affirmative actions work to the plaintiff’s 
detriment.129  In Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. School District of the City of 
                                                 
124 Lambert, supra note 40, at 567–68.  Courts must begin to recognize that the special 
relationship doctrine should apply between disabled school children and the schools they 
attend.  Id. at 568.  If courts do not acknowledge the application of this doctrine, students 
with developmental delays and mental impairments essentially have no defense against 
the frequent harassment and abuse against them.  Id. 
125 E.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 
1992) (en banc).  The court noted that even though the student was required to attend 
classes and the school officials could exercise discipline over the student, “the 
school . . . did not restrict D.R.’s freedom to the extent that she was prevented from meeting 
her basic needs.”  Id. at 1372. 
126 Id. at 1373.  In Middle Bucks, the high school student victim, who suffered from hearing 
problems and related communication problems, alleged that fellow students frequently 
forced her into the bathroom and physically and sexually abused her.  Id. at 1366.  
Accordingly, the student brought a § 1983 claim, asserting that the school should have 
taken action to correct the situation as the teacher should have been in the classroom 
during the alleged incidents or should have heard them taking place.  Id. 
127 Id. at 1373.  The Third Circuit rejected the in loco parentis theory for liability, stating 
students are not sufficiently restricted from seeking help outside the school on a daily 
basis.  Id. at 1372. 
128 See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding 
that the school did not enhance or create the danger); Maxwell ex. rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist., 
53 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“If a state actor creates a danger which harms an 
individual or renders him or her more vulnerable to that danger, although the state actor 
does not actually harm the individual the state actor may be held to have violated the due 
process clause.”). 
129 See Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff 
could maintain a constitutional claim by alleging that the police chief, a close personal 
friend of the man who killed his wife and her daughter, stopped the police officers from 
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Philadelphia, a Pennsylvania district court accepted a student’s § 1983 
claim under the state-created danger theory of liability.130  In Maxwell, 
two students attacked and raped a special education student while a 
substitute teacher, aware of the events that were transpiring, failed to 
intervene to stop the attackers.131  The court held the school district and 
teacher liable under the state-created danger test because the harm was 
foreseeable, the teacher acted in willful disregard of the victim’s safety, 
and the school district and the teacher directly placed the victim in 
harm’s way.132 
Conversely, in Teague v. Texas City Independent School District, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the state-created danger theory was inapplicable 
where a peer assaulted an eighteen-year-old Downs Syndrome student 
                                                                                                             
enforcing a restraining order issued in response to the wife’s complaints); Wood v. 
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 596 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding the state liable for injuries caused by a 
rape when a trooper impounded a woman’s car and left her to find her way home on foot).  
But see Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1374 (holding that the school defendants did not create 
plaintiff’s peril or increase the risk of harm to make the student more vulnerable to the 
assaults as sexual abuse from inadequate supervision was not foreseeable).  Davis suggests 
that the court in Middle Bucks got it wrong.  See Davis, supra note 41, at 1141.  In 1989 when 
Middle Bucks was decided, educators might have been able to argue that sexual assault was 
not a foreseeable consequence of inadequate supervision.  Id.  Today, however, in light of 
the significant evidence and news regarding peer-on-peer abuse, it is difficult to assert that 
sexual abuse in the classroom is unforeseeable.  Id. 
130 Maxwell, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 792–93.  In Maxwell, the court noted that during the day in 
question, the victim was unable to exit the room because the defendants had locked the 
door to the classroom.  Id. at 789.  Furthermore, the substitute teacher charged with 
supervising the students sat idly while watching the events occur.  Id. 
131 Id.  When the students became disruptive, the teacher explicitly stated to the students, 
“I don’t care what you do as long as you do not bother me.”  Id. 
132 Id. at 792–93.  The Maxwell court followed the Third Circuit four-part test for the state-
created danger basis for liability, as adopted in Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1997).  
Id. at 792.  Under this test, liability is found if: 
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the 
state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff; (3) 
there existed some relationship between the state and the plaintiff; 
[and] (4) the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity 
that otherwise would not have existed for the third party’s crime to 
occur. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kneipp, 95 F.3d. at 1208).  The Maxwell court first 
concluded that the rape was in fact a foreseeable and direct result of the substitute’s 
actions, as she had knowledge that the two perpetrating students had assaulted a different 
female student earlier that morning.  Id.  In addition, the court found that, in light of the 
teacher’s statement to the class that she did not care about their actions so long as she was 
left undisturbed, and because she sat idle while the assault occurred, the teacher acted with 
willful disregard for the victim’s safety.  Id. at 793.  Next, the court determined that the 
victim was also a foreseeable plaintiff because the teacher knew that she had been attacked 
previously.  Id.  Finally, the court found that the state created the opportunity for the attack 
when the school locked the door to the classroom and the teacher explicitly told the 
students that she would neither watch nor control them.  Id. 
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in the bathroom between classes, as the school did not have actual 
knowledge of the risk and did not disregard any excessive risk.133  This 
case demonstrated that, to some extent, the special relationship duty 
considers the age and maturity of the child involved.134  While the lower 
court initially ruled that a special relationship existed between the school 
and a cognitively disabled student, it vacated this finding upon learning 
the victim functioned at the level of a thirteen-year-old.135 
Despite the holding in Maxwell, courts generally refuse to impose 
§ 1983 liability upon schools as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in DeShaney.136  Courts consistently determine that compulsory school 
education laws do not change parents’ status as a child’s primary 
caretaker and schools have no affirmative duty to protect their 
                                                 
133 Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 185 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2006), aff’g 386 F. 
Supp. 2d 893 (S.D. Tex. 2005), vacating in part 348 F. Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Tex. 2004).  In 
Teague, a special education student was sexually assaulted by another student in the school 
bathroom between classes.  See id. at 357 (referring to facts delineated in Teague, 386 F. 
Supp. 2d at 894).  The student’s parent brought suit alleging that the school violated the 
student’s constitutional rights and should be held liable under § 1983.  Id.  The court noted 
that in order “[t]o secure liability against the state for private harm under section 1983, 
plaintiffs must show that their claims fit within the narrow class of exceptions to the 
DeShaney rule,” which includes either the special relationship exception or the state-created 
danger exception.  Id.  Initially, the district court in Teague denied the school’s motion to 
dismiss because the pleadings left room for finding that a special relationship existed 
between the plaintiff and the school.  348 F. Supp. 2d at 798.  Later, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the school finding no special relationship between the 
plaintiff and the school.  Teague, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 896.  Consideration of all the evidence, 
including uncontroverted evidence that the plaintiff functioned at the level of a thirteen-
year old, still led the court to conclude that no special relationship existed.  Id.  On appeal, 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Teague, 185 F. App’x at 357. 
134 Teague, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 896 n.1 (citing Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 
1415 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
135 Id. at 896.  The age of thirteen, whether functional or cognitive, was insufficient for the 
court to override precedent and find a special relationship existed, even in conjunction 
with compulsory attendance laws.  Id. 
136 See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that no 
special relationship existed and rejecting the victim’s § 1983 claim); D.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the 
argument that a special relationship had been formed due to the compulsory attendance 
laws and rejecting a § 1983 claim); see also Oren, supra note 109, at 49 (noting that it is 
difficult to shock the judicial conscience); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 670 
(“[T]he trend has been for courts to reject [the state-created danger exception] even in the 
face of seemingly egregious conduct on the part of school officials.”); Bethel, supra note 111, 
at 189 (stating that, “according to the court, [a] state’s requirement that children receive an 
education does not restrict students’ freedom to the extent that they [or their parents] are 
unable to meet their own basic needs;” and as a result, there is no affirmative duty to 
protect students from harm). 
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students.137  As a result, victims have continued to search for other 
causes of action to hold schools liable, including Title IX or the IDEA.138 
3. Other Attempts at a Cause of Action:  Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments Act of 1972 and the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act 
Alternatively, victims of peer-inflicted injuries have attempted to use 
Title IX as an available remedy against schools.139  Actions under Title IX, 
however, are automatically limited in scope to gender-based abuse or 
injuries, such as crimes involving a sexual element.140  Title IX states that 
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”141  Nevertheless, even if the victim can 
prove that the injury is gender-based, the threshold to establish liability 
is very difficult to meet.142  In Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County 
Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that a school district could be 
liable for acts of sexual abuse and harassment by a student if:  (1) the 
school had knowledge of the abuse or harassment; (2) the abuse or 
                                                 
137 See supra note 136 (reiterating that schools have no duty to protect students). 
138 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing plaintiffs’ claims under Title IX and the IDEA). 
139 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006); see, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (creating an exception where schools potentially can be held 
liable under Title IX); Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 
1119 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that if a school engages in egregious conduct that is severe, 
pervasive, and offensive, it can be held liable under Title IX); Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 
195 F.3d 845, 854–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (contending that Title IX may support a claim for 
student-on-student harassment). 
140 See Paul M. Secunda, At the Crossroads of Title IX and a New “IDEA”:  Why Bullying Need 
Not Be “A Normal Part of Growing Up” for Special Education Children, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 1, 3 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has yet to endorse the idea of a same-sex 
harassment cause of action for more common forms of bullying under Title IX . . . .”); Susan 
Stuart, Jack and Jill Go to Court:  Litigating a Peer Sexual Harassment Case Under Title IX, 29 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243, 245 (2005) (explaining the complicated nature of bringing a Title 
IX claim and warning that “courts are loathe to hold schools liable for sexual harassment 
under Title IX under any circumstances”). 
141 § 1681(a). 
142 See Ferster, supra note 40, at 203 (“The deliberate indifference standard is criticized as 
establishing a barrier to relief from all but unconscionable action or inaction by school 
officials.”); see also Secunda, supra note 140, at 8–9 (clarifying that in order to establish 
actionable misconduct, the victim must establish “three elements:  (1) that there was an 
‘appropriate person’ with the ability to take corrective action; (2) who had actual 
knowledge of the harassment; and (3) who responded with deliberate indifference to that 
knowledge”) (citations omitted).  This standard establishes difficult hurdles for victims to 
defeat in order to establish school liability.  Id. at 9. 
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harassment was severe, pervasive, and offensive; and (3) the school was 
deliberately indifferent to the victim’s injuries.143 
Post-Davis, courts continually reject claims for peer-inflicted injuries 
brought under Title IX unless the school acted in a clearly indifferent 
manner.144  For example, in Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, the court rejected 
the special education student’s Title IX claim based on the student-on-
student sexual harassment that occurred on school grounds.145  Similarly, 
in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, the Tenth 
Circuit dismissed a Title IX claim where a special needs student claimed 
that she was subject to numerous counts of sexual harassment and injury 
at the hands of her peers.146  The court explained that the school had 
neither been deliberately indifferent nor acted “unreasonabl[y] in light of 
the known circumstances.”147  Thus, to prevail under Title IX, a victim 
                                                 
143 Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.  In Davis, the parent of a fifth grade student sued the school, 
pursuant to Title IX, alleging that her daughter repeatedly had been sexually harassed by a 
fellow student.  Id. at 632.  The student had reported each episode to her mother and to the 
teacher, and the teacher told the mother that the principal had been informed of the 
harassment.  Id. at 633–34.  Nonetheless, no action was taken against the alleged harasser 
and the behavior continued for several months until the student was charged with sexual 
battery for his actions.  Id. at 634.  The Court noted that a Title IX claim “will lie only for 
harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the 
victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”  Id. at 633.  Furthermore, the 
Court stated that a school could only be held liable if it “intentionally acted in clear 
violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent” to the harassment.  Id. at 642. 
144 See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text (providing examples of post-Davis 
courts rejecting students’ claims). 
145 See Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that 
because the victim failed to prove both that the school had actual knowledge of the 
harassment and that the school was deliberately indifferent to the abuse, she did not have a 
viable Title IX claim); see also supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text (delineating the facts 
of Soper). 
146 Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
147 Rost, 511 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648).  In Rost, the mother of a special 
needs student filed suit against the school under Title IX, alleging that the school had 
actual knowledge of the ongoing sexual harassment and was deliberately indifferent to the 
numerous reports of such activity.  Id. at 1118.  The student had been coerced into various 
sex acts with a number of her male peers, beginning as early as the seventh grade.  Id. at 
1117.  The boys would threaten to show naked pictures of her at school and spread rumors 
about her promiscuous behavior.  Id.  The mother of the student claimed the school had “a 
custom of acquiescing to student-on-student sexual harassment and created a dangerous 
educational environment.”  Id. at 1118.  Even though it was undisputed that the student 
specifically told the school about the sexual harassment in question, the court still held that, 
because the school had not been deliberately indifferent or acted “unreasonabl[y] in light of 
the known circumstances,” it could not be liable.  Id. at 1121.  Specifically, the principal was 
not charged with such deliberate indifference because he claimed to have believed that 
these events were not taking place on school property, and thus he was under the 
impression that there was nothing he could do about it.  Id. at 1121–22. 
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must prove the school engaged in egregious conduct, acted indifferent, 
and the harassment was “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.”148 
Alternatively, disabled students who have been injured by peers 
have attempted to bring claims under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”).149  The IDEA was enacted with the goal of 
providing all children with disabilities a “free appropriate public 
education” (“FAPE”) in the least restrictive environment.150  If a school 
violates a child’s right to such an education, a parent can request a 
formal due process hearing and seek relief in the form of compensatory 
education or tuition reimbursement.151  Only when the parent has 
                                                 
148 Davis, 526 U.S. at 650; see Secunda, supra note 140, at 13–14 (reiterating this exacting 
standard). 
149 See Conn, supra note 40, at 792 (noting that some believed that the IDEA could prove 
“to be an ancillary or alternative path to holding American school districts accountable for 
protecting special students from harms and abuses at school”); Secunda, supra note 140, at 
16 (explaining that when a special education student is bullied or injured by a fellow 
student, the victim could potentially bring an IDEA-based § 1983 claim); Ferster, supra note 
40, at 211 (suggesting that victims can attempt to avoid the exacting standard of deliberate 
indifference by instead asserting a violation of the IDEA and a deprivation of any 
meaningful educational benefit). 
150 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006).  As guaranteed by the statute, 
 The term “free appropriate public education” means special 
education and related services that— 
 (A) have been provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction, and without charge; 
 (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; 
 (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or 
secondary school education in the State involved; and 
 (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized 
education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 
Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (noting that the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, which was the precursor the IDEA, “represent[ed] an ambitious federal 
effort to promote the education of handicapped children”); Mawdsley, supra note 67, at 361 
(explaining that the IDEA also contains a Least Restrictive Environment (“LRE”) 
requirement that mandates that students with disabilities be educated with regular 
education students “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate” (quoting 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(5)(A))).  As a result of this requirement, many students with disabilities will be 
educated in regular classrooms with regular education students, often leaving disabled 
students at risk for harmful interactions with their regular education counterparts.  Id. at 
361–62. 
151 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(6) (discussing the opportunity for a person claiming an alleged 
violation of the IDEA to bring a complaint).  The Court in Rowley also discussed the 
remedies available based on the statute when it states that 
[c]omplaints brought by parents or guardians must be resolved at “an 
impartial due process hearing,” and appeal to the state educational 
agency must be provided if the initial hearing is held at the local or 
regional level.  Thereafter, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and 
decision” of the . . . hearing has “the right to bring a civil action.” 
458 U.S. at 182 (citation omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(2), (c), (e)(2)). 
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exhausted all of these administrative remedies can they seek judicial 
review in state or federal court.152  Moreover, in Board of Education of 
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, the 
Supreme Court held that a student must show that the school’s actions 
denied her any meaningful benefit from her individualized educational 
program (“IEP”)153 in order to assert a denial of a FAPE.154 Still, it has 
                                                 
152 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(6);  see also Conn, supra note 40, at 797 (discussing cases 
demonstrating the importance of exhausting such remedies prior to bringing suit and 
noting that “[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies can be fatal to violation of IDEA 
claims”). 
153 458 U.S. at 203–04.  The United States Code defines the term “individualized 
education program” as follows: 
 The term “individualized education program” or “IEP” means a 
written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, 
reviewed, and revised in accordance with this section and that 
includes— 
 (I) a statement of the child’s present levels of academic 
achievement and functional performance . . . 
 . . . . 
 (II) a statement of measurable annual goals, including 
academic and functional goals . . . 
 . . . . 
 (III) a description of how the child’s progress toward 
meeting the annual goals described in subclause (II) will be 
measured . . . . 
 (IV) a statement of the special education and related services 
and supplementary aids and services . . . to be provided to the 
child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement of the program 
modifications or supports for school personnel that will be 
provided for the child . . . 
 . . . . 
 (V) an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child 
will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class 
and in the activities described in subclause (IV)(cc); 
 (VI)(aa) a statement of any individual appropriate 
accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic 
achievement and functional performance of the child on State and 
districtwide assessments consistent with section 1412(a)(16)(A) of 
this title . . . 
 . . . . 
 (VII) the projected date for the beginning of the services and 
modifications described in subclause (IV), and the anticipated 
frequency, location, and duration of those services and 
modifications; and  
 (VIII) beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect 
when the child is 16, and updated annually thereafter. 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(VIII). 
154 In Rowley, a student with hearing impairments brought a claim against the school 
district, asserting that the school denied her a FAPE by failing to provide her with a sign 
language interpreter.  458 U.S. at 184.  The school had prepared an IEP for the deaf student, 
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been difficult to establish that a student with disabilities has been 
deprived of any real benefit of an IEP due to an injury inflicted by a peer; 
as a result, plaintiffs often fail to meet the requirements for a successful 
claim under the IDEA.155 
As demonstrated, many students with disabilities suffer from peer-
inflicted injuries at school.156  As such, these victims attempt to use a 
variety of legal statutes and causes of action to hold these schools and 
school officials liable.157  Yet, while some victims have been successful in 
developing these different sources of law, many victims continue to be 
left without a remedy.158 
                                                                                                             
suggesting that she be placed in a regular classroom, use a hearing aid, receive assistance 
from a tutor for the deaf an hour a day, and receive assistance from a speech therapist three 
hours a week.  Id.  Rowley’s parents, however, wanted her to be provided with a sign 
language interpreter for her classes instead of the assistance proposed by the school.  Id.  
The Court concluded that to maintain a claim of a denial of a FAPE, the victim must assert 
a denial of any meaningful benefit under the student’s IEP.  Id. at 203–04.  The Court noted 
that in passing the IDEA, Congress only desired “to bring previously excluded 
handicapped children into the public education systems of the States and to require the 
States to adopt procedures which would result in individualized consideration of and 
instruction for each child.”  Id. at 189.  Because at the time of enactment of the IDEA, “one 
million [out of nearly eight million disabled children in the United States] were ‘excluded 
entirely from the public school system’ and more than half were receiving an inappropriate 
education.”  Id.  Congress simply intended to provide access to public education to these 
children.  Id. at 192.  As such, the Court emphasized that Congress did not impose “any 
greater substantive . . . standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”  
Id. 
155 See, e.g., R.P. ex rel. K.P. v. Springdale Sch. Dist., No. 06-5014, 2007 WL 552117, at *4 
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 21, 2007) (holding that despite a school’s repeated failure to combat 
constant harassment of a disabled student by his non-disabled peers, the school was not 
liable because the victim’s parents had “failed to exhaust their administrative remedies”).  
In R.P, the victim was a mentally impaired student who was born with a congenital heart 
disease.  Id. at *1.  Due to his mental impairments, the student was subjected to various 
violent assaults by his non-disabled classmates, including being confined in a dog cage, 
force-fed dog feces, and sexually assaulted.  Id.  As a result of these assaults, the victim’s 
parents alerted school officials, who assured them that their son would be safe at school.  
Id.  The victim’s therapist also contacted the school in order to establish a plan to help him 
return to school.  Id.  Despite the school’s alleged efforts to ensure the student’s safety, the 
harassment and ridicule continued.  Id.  Nonetheless, the court ultimately dismissed the 
complaint because the parents settled with the school prior to the scheduled hearings 
despite having begun the administrative process by filing two due process complaints.  Id. 
at *4. The court concluded that “settling the claims prior to the hearing does not, ‘rise to the 
level of an exhaustion of administrative remedies.’”  Id. at *4 (quoting S.A.S. v. Hibbing 
Pub. Sch., No. Civ. 04-3204JRTRLE, 2005 WL 1593011, at *3 (D. Minn. July 1, 2005)). 
156 See supra Part II.A (emphasizing that students with disabilities are disproportionately 
subject to victimization by peers). 
157 See supra Part II.B (explaining the traditional legal remedies utilized). 
158 See supra Part II.B (reviewing the relevant cases in which special education victims 
brought suit against schools for injuries inflicted by peers). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Despite the fact that many children with disabilities suffer from 
peer-inflicted injuries while under the supervision of school officials, 
most schools are able to escape liability from suit.159  This Part explains 
the strengths and weaknesses of the causes of action that victims attempt 
to utilize to hold schools accountable and how most of these options are 
doomed to fail.160  In addition, this Part critiques the analyses of several 
courts that considered the issue of peer-inflicted injuries.161  First, Part 
III.A critiques the theory of negligent supervision under state tort law, 
describes its successes and failures, but ultimately concludes that it is the 
most likely avenue for success.162  Next, Part III.B assesses the lack of 
effectiveness of causes of action brought under § 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and policy reasons for and against finding a special 
relationship between a school and its students.163  Finally, Part III.C 
evaluates courts’ treatment of actions brought pursuant to Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments Act of 1972 and under the IDEA.164 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Causes of Action Under Tort Theory of Negligent 
Supervision 
While theories of negligent supervision have statistically been 
proven to be one of the most effective means of legal remedy, there are 
still many obstacles that a victim must overcome before successfully 
                                                 
159 See Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 151 (noting that the law is inadequate both in 
terms of deterring peer-to-peer harassment and providing the victims any sort of redress); 
Secunda, supra note 140, at 3 (“[L]egal remedies for victims of bullying continue to be 
woefully inadequate.”); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643 (“The nation 
needs a change in its current legal theories.”).  Many victims are unable to hold schools 
accountable under theories of negligent supervision, causes of action under Title IX, or 
constitutional theories, and that even anti-bullying statutes fail to protect students from 
such harm.  Id. at 658–59. 
160 See infra Part III (discussing the strengths and weakness of the traditional legal 
remedies available to students who are victims of peer-inflicted injuries, and how, in many 
cases, schools and school officials are able to completely escape liability). 
161 See infra Part III (commenting on the reasoning of several courts’ decisions regarding 
peer-inflicted injuries). 
162 See infra Part III.A (discussing the state tort theory of negligent supervision and 
critiquing the hurdles that a victim must overcome in order to hold a school liable under 
this theory). 
163 See infra Part III.B (critiquing the flaws inherent in courts’ reasoning on § 1983 claims). 
164 See infra Part III.C (discussing claims under Title IX and the IDEA and the difficulties 
of successfully bringing a claim under these statutes). 
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holding a school liable.165  These obstacles include the issue of states 
granting schools and school officials immunity from suit, the difficulty in 
proving that the school’s negligence was the proximate cause of the 
injury, and the difficulty in establishing that the injury was in fact 
foreseeable.166 
1. Sovereign Immunity Issues 
First, some courts may be forced to dismiss tort claims against school 
officials, who are state actors, based on principles of sovereign immunity 
stemming from the Eleventh Amendment.167  Some states opt for 
immunity from claims brought by victims for injuries inflicted by their 
peers under the rationale of protecting the state from paying out huge 
awards in damages and avoiding the opening of the floodgates of 
litigation.168  These state interests in sovereign immunity are 
legitimate.169  Funds available to public schools are limited to begin with 
and should not be drained.170  Still, it is a well-settled theory of torts 
“that accident losses should be placed upon the party who is in the best 
position to prevent the injury.”171  In this case, schools are the best party 
able to prevent the injury through adequate supervision.172  Providing 
                                                 
165 See DeMitchell & Carroll, supra note 63, at 10–11 n.34 (noting that negligent 
supervision claims consisted of forty-three percent of negligence suits against schools that 
resulted in awards). 
166 See infra Part III.A (discussing the obstacles many victims of peer-inflicted injury face 
in their pursuit to hold schools liable). 
167 See supra note 64 (discussing the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity 
issues). 
168 Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683; see also, e.g., Yanero ex rel. Yanero v. 
Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 527 (Ky. 2001) (holding that the local school board was entitled to 
governmental immunity); Carr v. Salem City Schs., 48 Va. Cir. 84, 84 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1999) 
(holding that the school board was entitled to sovereign immunity). 
169 Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683. 
170 See Phillips, supra note 37, at 258 (“Public perception, whether accurate or not, is that 
expanding school liability will increase the cost of schools.”); Editorial, supra note 39 
(reporting that in 2009 nearly thirty-two percent of Americans perceive that lack of funding 
is the biggest problem facing public schools). 
171 Vandall, supra note 57, at 697–98.  Vandall discusses the area of products liability and 
contends that statutes of repose, which bar suit by a victim after a certain number of years, 
ignore the policy of prevention by placing the loss on a victim who is often unable to 
prevent the injury.  Id. at 698.  This is analogous to issues of sovereign immunity in schools, 
which also ignores the policy of prevention by placing liability on disabled students for 
injuries inflicted by peers.  Like victims injured by defective products, disabled students 
are often unable to prevent injuries. 
172 See Bodensteiner, supra note 39, at 6 (asserting that teachers are among those best-
positioned to prevent harassment); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 686 
(suggesting that courts and legislatures are uncomfortable placing additional 
responsibilities on overburdened and underpaid teachers).  Yet, “children are being 
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schools with unlimited liability from suit ignores the policy of 
prevention by oftentimes placing the loss on the victim, a disabled 
student, who is unable to prevent the injury.173  When a state chooses to 
insulate its schools and school officials from liability, presumably guilty 
parties can escape liability by meeting a minimal burden of proof.174 
Proponents for state immunity also cite the need to protect school 
officials from the fear of constant lawsuits.175  While it is logical to shield 
these officials from suit for being unable to control unpredictable and 
unforeseeable injuries, these injuries are not unforeseeable—nearly all 
students with disabilities are subject to harassment by their peers.176  
Providing immunity for schools and school officials merely “solves one 
problem at the expense of another and protects adults at the expense of 
the most vulnerable children.”177  Furthermore, providing immunity 
does nothing to encourage schools to adequately address issues of safety 
concerns, especially those surrounding children with disabilities.178  At 
the very least, the threat of tort liability encourages schools to take these 
issues more seriously and to be more careful at the outset.179 
                                                                                                             
brutalized on a daily basis,” and arguably it must stop.  Id. at 687.  Weddle also asserts that 
schools and teachers are in the best position to prevent such injuries and should be held 
liable for failure to intervene.  Id. 
173 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 686–87 (explaining the school is best 
able to prevent the injury). 
174 See, e.g., B.M.H. v. Sch. Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560, 573–74 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that the 
Virginia doctrine of sovereign immunity barred any action against teachers for simple 
negligence, and that the victim was only entitled to damages if the jury could conclude that 
the teacher’s actions constituted gross negligence); see also Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 
187 (“States that follow variations of this doctrine have made it difficult for victims to sue 
districts or employees for damages resulting from the negligent supervision of student 
bullies or the negligent enforcement of student conduct rules.”). 
175 Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683. 
176 See Campaign Information, supra note 48 (concluding that eight out of ten disabled 
students are subject to bullying and abuse because of their disabilities); see also supra Part 
II.A (discussing how students with disabilities are easy targets for peer-to-peer abuse). 
177 Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 687.  Weddle continues: 
Characterizing the result in that way is in some ways unfair and in 
some ways exactly accurate.  It is not the protecting of teachers and 
administrators that is deplorable; the alternative could cripple 
education.  It is the failing to protect the children that cannot continue 
if the nation is to take seriously its obligations to them. 
Id. 
178 See id. at 683 (suggesting that principles of state immunity do nothing to influence 
schools or officials to actually prevent the harms in the first place, which really should be 
the number one priority in this situation). 
179 See Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 190 (explaining that because the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is likely to shield schools from liability for peer-inflicted injuries, 
advocates must come up with creative solutions, including helping schools design 
preventative policies). 
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2. The Proximate Cause Issue 
Another area where courts are hesitant to rule in favor of a victim is 
the proximate cause element.180  Courts are reluctant to hold school 
districts liable for a student’s injuries when the injuries are inflicted by a 
peer or third party because they typically find that such injuries are a 
superseding act that severs the proximate cause.181  It is important that a 
school be free from liability for unforeseeable actions of a third party.182  
Nevertheless, simply because the injury is inflicted by a third party does 
not signify that the school was not culpable in its actions.183  When a 
school has been negligent and failed to supervise disabled students—
students who studies show typically need protection from peers—any 
resulting injury can also be attributed to the school.184 
3. The Foreseeability Issue 
Courts are also reluctant to hold that an injury inflicted upon a 
disabled student by a peer was foreseeable.185  Generally, all a school 
district must do is claim that it lacked actual or constructive notice of 
                                                 
180 See infra notes 181–84 (discussing proximate cause in cases of peer-inflicted injuries). 
181 Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 188–89; Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 
690. 
182 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 687–88 (noting the difficulty in 
anticipating actions by third parties). 
183 See id. at 690 (“[W]hile a school may have been derelict in its duty to supervise the 
children in its care, the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury will generally be attributed 
completely or in large measure to the student or students who actually attacked the 
plaintiff.”). 
184 See Mawdsley, supra note 67 at 359 (explaining that if a disabled student has an IEP, 
the school has specific knowledge of that student’s needs and behaviors).  This additional 
information could make it easier for victims to argue that the school possessed actual 
knowledge of the student’s condition and limitations, and thus Mawdsley questions 
whether the school should have taken greater steps to ensure that student’s safety.  Id. at 
364, 386. 
185 Weddle discusses this reality when he states that 
[w]hen victims attempt to hold schools accountable for failing to 
protect them from peer-on-peer abuse, courts routinely hold that, 
under theories of negligent supervision, the bullying and associated 
attacks and injuries were simply unforeseeable to the school officials 
who could have intervened, even though education research has 
repeatedly demonstrated that such abuse is occurring in virtually 
every school setting. 
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Marshall v. 
Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that 
the murder of a special education student on school grounds was not reasonably 
foreseeable). 
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such harm and they are free from liability.186  It is clear, however, that 
injuries to students with disabilities on school grounds are not only 
foreseeable but are in fact obvious.187  Studies show that nearly all 
students with disabilities are subject to harassment by their peers.188  
Additionally, any special education teacher can attest that instructing 
special education students is difficult, requiring teachers to be constantly 
vigilant to ensure that they adequately supervise these students in order 
to provide a safe learning environment.189  The reality is that disabled 
students are “special” and have unique relationships with their teachers 
and schools because they are wholly dependent on attentive and 
meticulous aid.190  The safety of disabled students depends in large part 
on schools placing them in a safe environment with adequate 
supervision; therefore, it is reasonable to find injuries to disabled 
students foreseeable when supervision is lacking.191  Courts’ rigid 
adherence to this idea that such harm is not foreseeable often leads to 
decisions that appear to defy common sense.192  But when the law takes 
                                                 
186 See Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 387 (“[C]ourts usually will not 
find [the school liable] unless school officials were aware of a specific threat and did 
nothing to prevent injury or school officials were simply absent altogether from an area 
where supervision was required.”). 
187 See Earhart, supra note 71, at 29 (noting that several school districts and state 
legislatures have responded with policies and legislation that acknowledge that “not only 
is bullying a foreseeable problem, it is so prevalent and inevitable that district-wide policies 
and state-wide legislation are needed to address it”).  Earhart also questions why, in light 
of all of these policies and legislation, courts still continue to cite lack of foreseeability as a 
justification in ruling in favor of schools.  Id.; see also Carlson, Flannery, & Kral, supra note 
48 (concluding that disabled students are bullied significantly more than children in 
regular education programs); Mawdsley, supra note 67, at 359 (reiterating that schools have 
knowledge of a student’s vulnerabilities if such information is listed in the student’s IEP); 
Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 643 (explaining that the educational 
community knows that such abuse is taking place on school grounds). 
188 Campaign Information, supra note 48; see also supra Part II.A (discussing how students 
with disabilities are easy targets for peer-inflicted injuries). 
189 Smith Telephone Interview, supra note 49; see also Mawdsley, supra note 67, at 361 
(explaining that the difficulty of supervising disabled students is compounded by the 
IDEA’s LRE requirement that a disabled student be educated, “[t]o the maximum extent 
appropriate,” with regular education students) (alteration in original). 
190 Lambert, supra note 40, at 569. 
191 See id. (comparing a disabled student with a preschooler, as both lack skills and 
knowledge to protect themselves and need placement in a safe environment where they 
will be closely supervised).  “As the age of the student (either chronological or 
developmental) decreases, the [school’s] duty to protect” should increase.  Id. at 571. 
192 See, e.g., Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. 
1999) (finding the school not liable under the theory of negligent supervision for the death 
of a special education student that occurred during lunch); Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the victim did not have a viable claim of 
negligence against the school); see also Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643 
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into account the unique situation of special education students and 
issues of peer-inflicted injury, it gives victims a real chance to seek some 
sort of remedy.193 
B. A Critique of the Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Causes of Action Under 
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
1. The Search for a Special Relationship 
As a result of DeShaney, most courts, citing a lack of special 
relationship between a school and a student, have refused to recognize a 
cause of action under § 1983 for any injuries or harms inflicted upon a 
child by a fellow student.194  There are three commonly cited policy 
reasons in support of the courts’ rejection of a special relationship 
between a disabled student and the school.195  First, refusing to find a 
special relationship allows legislative bodies to decide whether liability 
should be imposed.196  The state should have a choice as to whether it 
desires to create liability; the decision should not be forced on them by a 
court decision.197  Because the state created the educational system to 
satisfy the needs of the community, it should therefore also decide what 
level of risk is appropriate in public schools.198  Second, creating liability 
through finding a special relationship would help relatively few 
individuals while also opening the door to unnecessary suits in the 
                                                                                                             
(noting that victims often fail in attempts to hold schools accountable for acts of negligence 
that lead to injury). 
193 See, e.g., Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (holding the school liable, as students with special needs are uniquely vulnerable to 
threats by their peers); M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 685–
86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding the school liable under negligent supervision, as it is 
reasonably foreseeable that another student would harm a special education student). 
194 See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that the victim’s § 1983 claim was not viable); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim failed); see also Oren, supra note 109, at 49 (noting that victims rarely 
meet the exacting DeShaney standard, emphasizing the gross ineffectiveness of the state-
created danger exception to the standard); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 663 
(noting that victims bringing a § 1983 claim face a “tough road in demonstrating that a 
constitutional violation by the school flows from a tort committed by a fellow 
student . . . [and that] most cannot clear the substantial doctrinal hurdles courts have 
placed in the path of those seeking to hold state actors liable for injuries”). 
195 See Phillips, supra note 37, at 262–63 (explaining the underlying policy reasons against 
a special relationship). 
196 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); Phillips, 
supra note 37, at 262. 
197 Phillips, supra note 37, at 262; see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. 
198 Phillips, supra note 37, at 262. 
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already overcrowded court system.199  Finally, substantial damage 
awards under § 1983 take money out of the education system and drain 
the already limited amount of funds available for public education in the 
state.200 
Nevertheless, “fears that recognizing [a special relationship] will 
cause excessive litigation, unwarranted awards, and rising insurance 
premiums” are unfounded.201  Concluding that a special relationship 
exists would only help the victim prove that the school official was 
acting “under color of law.”202  The victim must still prove causation.203  
Even if such fears were legitimate, however, it would be more harmful to 
society to allow disabled students to be subjected to continued rape, 
molestation, and severe abuse in school than to hold a school that failed 
to adequately supervise liable for a disabled student’s injuries.204  
Additionally, a school’s failure to recognize the student’s injuries can 
compound the emotional impact for the disabled student.205  Legal 
remedies should be available to victims in instances where the school 
fails to protect its disabled students from harm.206 
Furthermore, many courts continually reject the special relationship 
doctrine on the premise that schools do not completely restrict the 
freedom of their students and that students will eventually have the 
opportunity to seek some sort of help outside of the schoolhouse gates.207  
                                                 
199 Id.  Recognizing a § 1983 claim may only help a few victims because the threshold of 
proof is very high.  Id.  Furthermore, as § 1983 allows for an award of attorneys’ fees 
pursuant to § 1988, it gives lawyers an incentive to bring more § 1983 claims.  Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Davis, supra note 41, at 1162 (arguing in the context of sexual harassment claims 
against public schools for discrimination based on gender); see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 
258 (“[I]n contrast to public perception, creating a special relationship will not produce a 
myriad of large civil awards against the schools.”). 
202 Phillips, supra note 37, at 258. 
203 Id. 
204 Cf. Davis, supra note 41, at 1163 (making the same argument regarding the issue of 
sexual harassment in schools). 
205 See Bodensteiner, supra note 39, at 4 (explaining the educational and emotional impact 
harassment can have on students); Davis, supra note 41, at 1163 (reiterating the devastating 
effects of harassment, particularly when the school fails to acknowledge that the student 
has been injured). 
206 See Lambert, supra note 40, at 571 (stating that most commentators, unlike the majority 
of courts to consider the issue, favor placing a constitutional duty on schools and school 
officials); see also infra Part IV (proposing that courts deem injuries inflicted by peers on 
disabled students as foreseeable so that these victims have a remedy against these abuses). 
207 See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting 
the fact that a child must attend public school does not make a child’s guardian incapable 
of caring for the child’s fundamental needs); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that there was no 
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Still, when a victim is in the school’s custody, her freedom to seek help 
from abuse is completely restricted.208  It is also difficult to establish that 
there is no way she could have protected herself without affirmative 
action by the school.209 
Most importantly, critics of the special relationship doctrine ignore 
the unique reality faced by disabled students who, unlike their regular 
education counterparts, may be restricted in their ability to obtain help 
due to limitations imposed by their disabilities.210  Students with 
disabilities may lack the basic understanding and communication skills 
of a normal child, which in turn can prevent a student from obtaining 
help, even once she returns home.211  For example, the student may not 
understand that the injury inflicted is wrong.212  Also, even if the 
disabled child knows that the injury is wrong, she may be unable to 
successfully communicate it to an adult.213  Because of this unique 
situation, the safety of students with disabilities depends in large part on 
schools placing them in a safe environment and protecting them from 
third-party harm.214 
Furthermore, the theory that no special relationship exists between a 
student and a school essentially assumes a child is left without 
                                                                                                             
custodial or special relationship created because the parents, not the state, remained the 
student’s primary caretaker). 
208 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666 (reiterating that a student is 
unable to leave school during school hours and thus is restricted from seeking help). 
209 See id. at 664 (explaining the weakness of the custodial relationship approach).  
Weddle explains that 
[t]he Achilles heel of the custodial relationship approach is that the 
school must have so limited the victim’s freedom to seek help that he 
could not protect himself from his attacker without the affirmative 
intervention of the school[, and that] the victim must show that he was 
so cut off from outside aid that there was no one in the victim’s life 
that he could turn to for aid other than school officials themselves. 
Id. 
210 See Lambert, supra note 40, at 569 (comparing a disabled student with a preschooler, as 
both lack skills and knowledge to protect themselves and need placement in a safe 
environment where they will be closely supervised). 
211 See id. at 570 (“Children with developmental delays often lack the communication 
skills necessary to avail themselves of parental assistance.”). 
212 See id. at 570–71 (emphasizing that parents of special needs students rely on schools to 
keep their children safe and to be their “eyes and ears” to alert them of wrongdoing in the 
school). 
213 See id. at 571 (reiterating that a student with disabilities may lack communication 
skills). 
214 See id. at 569 (asserting that injuries to developmentally delayed or disabled students 
at school are foreseeable given their unique position and that these students are often 
completely dependent on their educators). 
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protection while in school.215  Yet, this reasoning is questionable as a 
result of recent Supreme Court decisions such as Vernonia School District 
47J v. Acton.216  In Vernonia, the Court emphasized the nature of a 
school’s custodial power and its need to closely supervise students in 
order to justify a school’s drug testing policy.217  The Court specifically 
stated that, for many purposes, school authorities act with in loco parentis 
authority and, as a result, have a “duty to ‘inculcate the habits and 
manners of civility.’”218  Likewise, in Board of Education of Independent 
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Supreme Court 
again relied on the substantial need to protect students from the harms 
of childhood drug use in order to justify a drug testing policy.219  It is 
difficult to reconcile the differences between the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in school drug testing cases—which are supported by the need 
to protect children from drug use—with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
DeShaney and its application in cases of peer-inflicted injury—where 
courts refuse to find that schools have a duty to protect students.220 
Finally, the courts’ refusal to find a special relationship is difficult to 
reconcile with a proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
asserting that a special relationship exists between a school and its 
students, giving rise to a duty of reasonable care.221  Therefore, the 
                                                 
215 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666 (noting that if the school decides 
not to act, the child is essentially left without a remedy and must remain in school where he 
is subject to torment and the parents can do nothing about it).  But see Mawdsley, supra note 
67, at 388 (explaining that, with the presence of an IEP, a disabled student does have some 
limited protection available while at school).  However, this level of protection could be 
limited to the standard of care the school delineated in an IEP.  Id. 
216 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (upholding a school drug 
testing policy).  While considering the Fourth Amendment issue involved, the Vernonia 
Court noted that it could not “disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility 
for children.”  Id. at 656.  As such, it appears that the Supreme Court is more inclined to 
protect students from drug use than it is to protect students from physical abuse of others.  
See id.; see also supra note 102 (comparing a state’s duty under DeShaney with drug testing 
jurisprudence). 
217 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
218 Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)).  Nonetheless, 
the Court appears to limit application of the terms “habits” and “manners of civility” to the 
context of drugs and speech and would not extend it to the context of preventing students 
from injuring fellow students.  See id. 
219 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002). 
220 Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) 
(holding that the state had no constitutional duty to protect), with Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655 
(emphasizing the custodial powers of a school and the requirement of supervision that is 
necessary in order to create a proper educational environment). 
221 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(a)–(b)(5) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).  The 
Restatement suggests that a school is in a special relationship with its students and owes its 
students a duty of reasonable care.  See supra notes 66, 68 (discussing the Restatement’s 
finding of a special relationship). 
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assumption by the courts that no special relationship exists between 
students and school officials is inconsistent with certain legal precedent, 
secondary authorities, and research.222  On a related note, it also leads to 
many victims being left without an effective cause of action.223 
2. The Difficulty of Establishing a State-Created Danger 
Victims additionally attempt to argue that the school created or 
enhanced the risk of harm, thus falling within the purview of the state-
created danger exception.224  Most courts deny claims under this theory 
and refuse to hold schools accountable unless the school or school 
official participated in some sort of affirmative act that increased or 
enhanced the danger to the student; simple inaction or failure to act is 
generally insufficient.225  Many harsh decisions have resulted, drawing 
the criticism of commentators who suggest that these decisions do 
nothing to encourage a school to implement positive changes.226  Rather, 
under the present standard, a school that is aware of abuse yet does not 
take any active role in stopping or preventing it is not liable so long as 
                                                 
222 See supra Part II.B.2 (reiterating the legal precedent, secondary authorities, and 
research that address § 1983 causes of action). 
223 See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the premise that the school could be held liable under § 1983).  
Although the victim alleged that the teacher could have been able to prevent such acts of 
abuse from taking place, the court rejected that the teacher had any duty to do so.  Id. at 
1371–72.  Disabled children and their parents are in a difficult situation as Weddle depicts: 
 While there is something disturbing about the fact that the state 
can compel children to attend school yet not incur a duty to protect 
them from their peers, the Court’s approach actually makes a good 
deal of constitutional sense. . . . 
 On the other hand, such a formulation ignores the significant 
disability placed upon school children . . . [as they] must remain in the 
school where the torment is carried out, and the parents can do 
nothing to shield [them] from the torment. 
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666. 
224 See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1993) (arguing that 
the state created or enhanced the danger). 
225 See Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 185 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(asserting that there was no state-created danger present in the case as the school did not 
have actual knowledge of attacks and did not disregard such knowledge at the excessive 
risk to the victim); see also Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 667 (noting that it is 
difficult to hold schools accountable, as “courts have been unwilling to view the inaction as 
a danger-enhancing affirmative act absent deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s plight”). 
226 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 667 (commenting that victims are 
rarely successful in persuading the courts that “the conduct of school officials in the face of 
severe bullying has been so shocking that the state could be characterized as having created 
or enhanced the danger”). 
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such actions do not shock the conscience of the court.227  Even in cases 
where students were left unsupervised, courts have refused to hold the 
school accountable for negligence under the state-created danger theory, 
reducing the theory to simply “that one comment toward the end of the 
DeShaney opinion.”228 
As a result of this reasoning, schools are free to continue acting 
deliberately indifferent to a disabled student’s plight without fear of 
repercussions under § 1983.229  A victim bringing a § 1983 claim will find 
it very difficult to establish a special relationship or prove that the state 
created the danger.230  Despite the substantial authority suggesting that 
schools do maintain a special relationship with its students, courts are 
still reluctant to hold schools responsible and generally will refuse a 
victim’s § 1983 claim.231 
C. The Costs and Benefits of Actions Under Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments Act of 1972 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act 
Initially, the most obvious bar to a vast number of claims under Title 
IX is the requirement that there be some type of sexual element to the 
injury.232  This is because Title IX applies only to discrimination based on 
sex.233  Therefore, Title IX is likely an ineffective remedy in many cases 
from the outset because the harassment tends not to be based on gender, 
but rather on disability.234  Still, the fact that a Title IX cause of action is 
                                                 
227 See Oren, supra note 109, at 49 (suggesting that it is difficult to shock the judicial 
conscience); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 670 (“[T]he trend has been for 
courts to reject [the state-created danger exception] even in the face of seemingly egregious 
conduct on the part of school officials.”).  But see Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist., 53 F. 
Supp. 2d 787, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding the school liable under the theory of state-created 
danger even though most courts reject this theory). 
228 Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 734. 
229 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 667 (noting the lack of success in 
bringing a § 1983 claim). 
230 See supra Part II.B.2 (reviewing the current § 1983 jurisprudence). 
231 See supra Part II.B.2.a (analyzing the special relationship exception to the DeShaney 
rule). 
232 See supra text accompanying note 141 (quoting Title IX codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2006)). 
233 But see Secunda, supra note 140, at 5 (noting that although most courts have not 
evaluated the complex legal issues surrounding students with disabilities who are subject 
to harassment, “when another student bullies a special education child based on that 
child’s appearance, behavior, or failure to live up to stereotyped notions of gender, it is 
necessary to consider the intersection between Title IX and . . . the Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).”). 
234 See Conn, supra note 40, at 791–92 (noting that the harassment must contain a sexual 
element or gender-basis to fall under Title IX). 
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limited to gender harassment makes a good deal of sense.235  Title IX was 
not intended to serve as a remedy for injuries inflicted on disabled 
students by peers, although many victims have tried to use it as such.236 
Another barrier to Title IX claims is the deliberate indifference 
standard articulated in Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of 
Education.237  The deliberate indifference standard is favorable for school 
districts because it focuses on specific instances of known harassment 
rather than anticipating future acts of third parties.238  It is based upon 
the premise that recipients of federal funds should only be held liable for 
their own actions, not the actions of third parties.239  Still, because Title IX 
does not place an affirmative duty on behalf of the school to anticipate 
harassment or injuries inflicted by peers, it does not force schools or 
school officials to prevent such behavior in the first place.240  To avoid 
being charged with deliberate indifference, it is not even necessary for a 
school to stop the harassment—all a school must do is simply investigate 
the alleged incident and it can defeat the victim’s claim.241 
Similarly, some believed that the IDEA would provide students with 
disabilities a way of remedying harms inflicted by peers in school.242  
Nevertheless, in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, the Supreme Court held that a school is only liable for 
violation of the IDEA when actions by school officials rise to such a level 
so as to deny any meaningful benefit of education.243  This standard is 
justified by the fact that the main purpose of the IDEA was only to 
provide access to educational opportunities for students with disabilities; 
nothing more, and nothing less.244  Given the time period in which 
                                                 
235 See generally Stuart, supra note 140, at 245–47 (providing an overview of Title IX and 
related jurisprudence). 
236 See, e.g., Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1124 
(10th Cir. 2008) (denying a victim’s Title IX claim). 
237 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999); see also Ferster, supra note 40, at 195 (reiterating that the 
success rate for Title IX claims is very low because of the deliberate indifference standard). 
238 Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 661. 
239 Davis, 526 U.S. at 640–41. 
240 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 660 (explaining that the Davis 
deliberate indifference standard offers little motivation for schools or school officials to be 
proactive in preventing any harassment or injuries to students). 
241 See, e.g., Rost, 511 F.3d at 1121 (concluding that the principal’s investigation was 
sufficient to defeat the claim of deliberate indifference). 
242 See generally Ferster, supra note 40, at 212–17 (outlining the FAPE standard under the 
IDEA). 
243 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982). 
244 Ferster, supra note 40, at 207; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3) (2006) (“[T]his chapter has 
been successful in ensuring children with disabilities and the families of such children 
access to a free appropriate public education and in improving educational results for 
children with disabilities.”). 
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Congress passed the IDEA and the Supreme Court decided Rowley, the 
goal of simply providing educational access to disabled students made 
sense.245  With only half of the over eight million children with 
disabilities receiving appropriate educational services and over one 
million disabled children being excluded from education altogether, 
simply getting children with disabilities in schools was an 
accomplishment at the time.246  Now, however, the framework under 
which the Court decided Rowley is outdated and “inconsistent with the 
modern view of special education.”247  As a result of the low standard 
that courts require a school to meet, causes of action under the IDEA 
frequently fail.248 
Causes of action under the IDEA, however, may be an appealing 
standard for the courts to apply because of the remedies involved, 
despite the fact that several claims under the IDEA have failed.249  
Causes of action under § 1983 or Title IX have the potential to result in 
large monetary damage awards, whereas remedies under the IDEA are 
limited to tuition reimbursement or compensatory education.250  As such, 
allowing for such claims to proceed could remedy situations in which 
plaintiffs do not need or desire money damages.251  Still, given the pain 
and humiliation disabled victims often face in cases of peer-inflicted 
abuse, this remedy is less than desirable for the victim.252 
Therefore, as demonstrated in this Part, there are some strengths and 
many weaknesses in the courts’ analyses of claims brought by disabled 
students for harms inflicted by peers.253  Bringing claims under the 
previously discussed causes of action leaves many victims without relief 
and many schools without any sense of accountability.254  Refusing to 
                                                 
245 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189; Ferster, supra note 40, at 213. 
246 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189; Ferster, supra note 40, at 213. 
247 Ferster, supra note 40, at 213. 
248 See, e.g., R.P. ex rel. K.P. v. Springdale Sch. Dist., No. 06-5014, 2007 WL 552117, at *4 
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 21, 2007) (failing to hold a school liable for a violation of the IDEA). 
249 See Ferster, supra note 40, at 228 (suggesting that the IDEA is a superior remedy, as 
“students with legitimate claims can find relief as IDEA intended, by attending school free 
from harassment and gaining a meaningful benefit from their education”). 
250 See id. at 227 (asserting that because the stakes are lower for the schools involved than 
in claims pursuant to § 1983 or Title IX, there is “no need to apply a strict deliberate 
indifference standard to protect schools from devastating liability”). 
251 See id. at 225 (acknowledging that the current trend among courts is to deny claims 
under the IDEA). 
252 Id. 
253 See supra Part III (analyzing the flaws in bringing claims under various causes of 
action). 
254 See supra Part III (discussing the strengths and weakness of the traditional legal 
remedies available to students who are victims of peer-inflicted injuries, and how, in many 
cases, schools and school officials are able to completely escape liability). 
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find schools liable for failure to supervise disabled students and prevent 
foreseeable peer-inflicted injuries is unjustified, yet this is typically the 
result due to our current legal framework.255  It is apparent, however, 
that the cause of action with the greatest likelihood of success is the 
theory of negligent supervision.256  Still, even the theory of negligent 
supervision in its current state has its flaws.257 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Children with disabilities are suffering from injuries inflicted by 
their peers while they are in the custody of and under the supervision of 
school officials.258  It is all too often the case that school officials who 
know or have reason to know of abuse either turn a blind eye to the 
violence or react in a manner that encourages such behavior.259  Schools 
and school officials who allow awful acts of abuse to occur are generally 
able to escape liability from suit, leaving the student victims without any 
remedy.260  Therefore, the current legal theories remain inadequate and 
are in need of change.261  The very welfare of our nation’s students 
depends on it.262  Schools and school officials must be held accountable 
for failing to adequately supervise their students.  Knowing that there 
will be consequences for allowing acts of peer-inflicted abuse to occur 
will provide schools with the necessary incentive to remedy the 
situation.263  Without such an incentive, there is little likelihood that any 
school would be motivated to change. 
There is hope evidenced by the small number of victims who have 
recently prevailed under theories of negligent supervision in courts that 
                                                 
255 See supra Part III (commenting on the reasoning of several courts’ decisions regarding 
peer-inflicted injuries). 
256 See supra Part III.A (discussing the theory of negligent supervision). 
257 See supra Part III.A (critiquing the theory of negligent supervision and noting its 
flaws). 
258 See Weddle, Brutality & Blindness, supra note 64, at 395 (“[C]ourts should state very 
plainly and directly that school officials already know or should know that bullying is 
prevalent in every [sic] virtually every school . . . .”); see also supra Part II.A (commenting on 
how children with disabilities are disproportionately subjected to abuse by their peers 
while in school). 
259 See supra Part II.B (exploring various cases in which schools and school officials have 
failed to effectively intervene and prevent abuse inflicted by peers upon students with 
disabilities). 
260 See supra Part III (analyzing the current legal theories utilized by victims). 
261 See supra Part III (establishing the general ineffectiveness of the current legal theories). 
262 Dolan, supra note 37, at 216. 
263 See Weddle, Brutality & Blindness, supra note 64, at 391 (“The legal requirements 
governing school officials’ duty to supervise their students need to be realigned to reflect 
these realities about bullying, its prevalence, its effects, and its prevention.”). 
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recognize that harm inflicted upon special education students by their 
peers is in fact foreseeable.264  Thus, this Part proposes that one method 
of updating the way in which our legal system addresses the issue of 
disabled students and peer-inflicted abuse is to build upon a theory of 
negligent supervision, specifically taking into account the unique 
situation of disabled students.265  First, Part IV.A proposes a model state 
statute that recognizes that special education students stand in a special 
relationship with schools and deems harms to special needs students by 
their peers foreseeable.266  Accordingly, courts should take notice of, and 
begin to implement, the proposed statute, which utilizes the approach 
adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the California Court of 
Appeals.267  In addition, Part IV.B recommends a model jury instruction 
for courts to use in establishing a presumption of a school’s duty to 
supervise students with disabilities.268  By applying both the proposed 
statute and proposed jury instruction regarding the presumption, our 
legal system will take into account the unique situation of students with 
disabilities and can hold schools accountable for negligence. 
A. Adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts and California Approach to 
Theories of Negligent Supervision and Children with Disabilities 
First, courts throughout the nation must acknowledge reality and 
take notice of the fact that students with disabilities are often the targets 
of injuries and victimization by their fellow students.269  With studies 
demonstrating that eight out of ten students with disabilities are subject 
to abuse or harassment, a court’s conclusion that such acts of abuse are 
unforeseeable defies logic.270  Students are entrusted to a school’s care 
and peer-inflicted injuries occur while the victim is under a school’s 
watch.  States should adopt the subsequent model statute, which applies 
the reasoning of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and California 
                                                 
264 See supra Part III.A.3 (examining cases discussing the foreseeability of harm to 
students with disabilities). 
265 See infra Part IV (proposing that courts should view the infliction of injury on special 
education students by their peers as foreseeable). 
266 See infra Part IV.A (outlining a model state statute establishing the presumption of 
foreseeability) 
267 See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that courts adopt a method of reasoning similar to the 
California Court of Appeals and congruent with the Restatement (Third) of Torts regarding 
foreseeability of peer-inflicted injuries  upon children with disabilities). 
268 See infra Part IV.B (presenting a model jury instruction that explains the presumption 
of foreseeability defined in the model state statute). 
269 See supra Part II.A (commenting on how children with disabilities are 
disproportionately subject to abuse by their peers while in school). 
270 See supra Part II.A (exploring studies and statistics confirming that harm to students 
with disabilities is unfortunately very common in schools). 
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appellate courts and mandates that schools have a special relationship 
with disabled students; therefore, injuries to special education students 
are foreseeable. 
Proposed State Statute:  Special Relationship Between School 
and Disabled Student 
 
 Any public educational institution in this state 
stands in a special relationship with all special needs 
students who attend the institution.  A special needs 
child is one who suffers from a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities including but not limited to walking, 
talking, sleeping, eating, and working.  The child must 
be diagnosed by a doctor or mental health professional 
and the school must have record of the disability. 
 
 A school with knowledge that the child is disabled, 
particularly where the school provides specialized 
education or instruction, stands in a special relationship 
with the student and has a heightened duty to protect 
the student from all foreseeable injuries.  It is foreseeable 
that a disabled student may be harmed by himself or 
peers without adequate supervision.  Schools should 
provide every special needs classroom with a classroom 
aide and should restrict the ratio of disabled students to 
adults accordingly.  If a disabled student is injured at 
school, it is presumed that the school is liable for breach 
of its special duty of care. 
 
Exclusion: 
 A school will not be liable to a disabled student 
under the special relationship standard where the school 
has provided adequate supervision and taken all 
reasonably necessary precautions.  The following 
factors, taken alone or together, may demonstrate that 
the school should not be liable.  The following factors 
are not exclusive: 
 
 1) The school restricted the number of special needs 
students per teacher, per classroom; 
 2) The special needs classroom was equipped with 
an aide; 
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 3) A school maintained a policy mandating that an 
adult must always accompany a special needs student 
on school grounds; and 
 4) Teachers were provided sensitivity training, 
specifically targeting peer-on-peer abuse. 
Commentary 
The proposed state statute establishes that students with disabilities 
fall within the special relationship standard of care set forth in 
DeShaney.271  This statute mandates that the special relationship between 
schools and disabled students creates a foreseeable risk of harm; 
therefore, schools will be presumed liable for peer-on-peer abuse that 
occurs at school.  By adopting this statute, states will clarify to schools 
and their officials the duties they owe to disabled students.   The 
proposed statute’s reasoning and rule are supported by the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, cases arising out of the California Court of Appeals, and 
many additional authorities.272 
A school must fully appreciate “the dangers posed by failing to 
adequately supervise its students, particularly special education 
students.”273  “When a school district instructs special education 
[students], it takes on the unique responsibilities associated with this 
instruction and the special needs of these children.”274  Thus, the school 
must understand that there is a foreseeabilty of harm to these particular 
students.  As such, schools have a duty to disabled students based on 
“the foreseeability of harm to special education students, the well-settled 
statutory duty of school districts to take all reasonable steps to protect 
them . . . and the paramount policy concern of providing our children 
with safe learning environments.”275  A disabled student cannot 
reasonably be expected to care for himself at all times; instead, the 
disabled student relies on the school for protection.276 
The statute proposed above provides schools with “an incentive to 
drive compliance with the duty to provide adequate supervision.”277  
School districts that are faced with the prospect of liability for failure to 
                                                 
271 See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing the DeShaney special 
relationship standard). 
272 See supra notes 68, 80–84 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition that 
schools have a duty to protect disabled students from harm). 
273 M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003). 
274 Id. at 682. 
275 Id. at 683. 
276 Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
277 Id. at 282. 
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supervise their students will take more precautionary measures 
designed to limit their liability, thus increasing the level of safety for 
students.  The proposed statute does not seek to hold all schools liable or 
to allow frivolous lawsuits.  Therefore, the exception provides model 
factors that schools can use to defeat the presumption of liability.  States 
should adopt the proposed statute because (1) it benefits disabled 
students by providing them with a remedy for foreseeable injuries that 
occur at school; (2) it establishes a heightened duty that schools owe to 
disabled students; and (3) it provides schools with an incentive to take 
precautionary steps to fulfill their heightened duty.  Furthermore, the 
proposed statute allows schools to escape liability if the school has taken 
steps to provide adequate supervision.  Given its fairness to and benefit 
for all parties, states should adopt the proposed statute. 
B. Children with Disabilities and Peer-Inflicted Injury:  A Presumption of 
Duty and Foreseeabilty 
Alternatively, courts should recognize a presumption that schools 
have a duty to supervise students with disabilities and that it is 
reasonably foreseeable for a student with a disability to be injured by a 
peer, absent such supervision.  Such a presumption would ensure that 
schools effectively deal with the issue of children with disabilities and 
peer-inflicted injuries, even if states refuse to adopt the aforementioned 
proposed statute.  Furthermore, presumptions of duty and foreseeability 
will provide victims a way to hold schools accountable because it closes 
the primary door through which school officials so often escape.  No 
longer could a school defend against liability by asserting that it lacked 
actual or constructive notice of the harm. 278  As a result, victims would 
have an adequate remedy.  A model presumption that could be 
incorporated into jury instructions follows: 
Presumption of Duty and Foreseeability for Injuries Inflicted 
upon Students with Disabilities 
1.  Defendant, a school, has a duty to adequately 
supervise students with disabilities in its charge.  This 
duty requires a degree of reasonable care applicable to 
circumstances; in the case of a student with a disability, 
the circumstances require a higher degree of care due to 
the heightened responsibilities associated with 
educating a student with disabilities. 
                                                 
278 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing how the requirement of foreseeabilty acts as a bar to 
valid claims of negligent supervision). 
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2.  Defendant, a school, as a custodian of a student with 
disabilities, is also charged with the knowledge that 
students with disabilities face a general risk of harm 
from their peers, and, as such, any resulting peer-
inflicted injuries will be deemed foreseeable.  This 
presumption may be rebutted with evidence that the act 
of a third party was a truly intervening cause and no 
degree of supervision could reasonably have prevented 
the injury. 
 
3.  A failure to fulfill any such duty is negligence and 
denial of foreseeability does not serve as a defense. 
Commentary 
This presumption assumes that schools know what research has 
already established—students in general are at risk of peer-inflicted 
injuries and students with disabilities are disproportionately subject to 
such injuries.279  This presumption would finally hold the schools 
accountable for failure to adequately supervise students.280  The 
proposed presumption could be used under a negligent supervision 
claim or a § 1983 claim.  If courts apply both this proposed presumption 
and states enact the proposed state statute for negligent supervision, 
legal theory will finally reflect the reality of the situation and provide 
victims with much needed relief.  It is essential that courts understand 
that, given the circumstances, schools have an enhanced duty when 
dealing with these students and injuries to special education students are 
foreseeable. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Under the current legal structure, Renee Soper, the victim from Part I 
of this Note, was unable to hold her school liable for its negligence.281  
                                                 
279 See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 701 (“Research has demonstrated that 
bullying exists in nearly every school setting and that the most potent indicator of its 
prevalence and strength is the leadership of the administration and staff of the school.”). 
280 See id. (“It is therefore neither fair nor rational to exempt school officials from a duty 
to prevent bullying, and it is neither truthful nor logical to ignore the causal connection 
between the failure to supervise children and the likelihood they will bully and injure each 
other.”); see also supra Part II.A (noting that students with disabilities are disproportionately 
subject to peer-inflicted injuries). 
281 See Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part I 
(introducing Renee and her story). 
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Even though the school had prior notice of Renee’s encounter with 
Brandon, and even though Ms. Soper had repeatedly informed the 
school of the potential for an attack, the school refused to remedy the 
situation and an assault occurred.  Renee was left without a remedy and 
the school was left free of liability. 
Fortunately, if states utilize both of the proposed solutions set forth 
in this Note, victims like Renee will stand a chance of holding schools 
liable for negligence.  If the state legislatures take into account the unique 
situation of special education students in schools and understand that 
harm to special education students is in fact foreseeable, victims like 
Renee will have a stronger likelihood of prevailing and recovering 
something for the unbearable injury they suffered.  Furthermore, if 
courts begin to recognize a presumption of foreseeabilty of harm to 
children with disabilities in the context of peer-inflicted injuries, victims 
like Renee will no longer bear such a heavy burden of proof.  Schools 
will be unable to rest on the argument that the injury was not 
foreseeable, but rather will have a duty to protect students with 
disabilities. 
Schools and school officials must be held accountable for failing to 
adequately supervise their students.  By imposing liability on schools for 
allowing acts of peer-inflicted abuse to occur on campus, the courts will 
provide schools with the necessary incentive to remedy the situation.  
Under the new proposed framework, schools will be put on notice that 
they could in fact be held liable for failing to adequately supervise 
special education students in their charge.  Consequently, they hopefully 
will increase the level of safety and protection they provide for their 
students. 
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